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EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION A
BOARD-BASED SOLUTIONf
CHARLES M. ELSON *
INTRODUCTION
Envy, for better or worse, is a fundamental part of the human
condition. Whether we admit it or not, most of us take a keen interest
in the financial status of our neighbors. Few aspects of existence in
contemporary society create more anger, resentment and dissension
than how much we are compensated for our daily toils in comparison
to what our fellow workers earn. It is this simple fact, along with
distributive justice concerns, that explain the cause of the extraordi-
nary popular attention and fury directed at the seemingly innocuous
issue of executive compensation. Within the last several months, both
the popular and financial media have devoted much attention to the
charge that the executives of America's largest and most respected
public corporations are being grossly overpaid for their services, at the
expense of their shareholders, employees and the general public.'
Comparisons are made with historic U.S. compensation levels and the
f Copyright m 1993 CHARLES M. ELSON
* Associate Professor, Stetson University College of Law; A.B., Hamar(' University, 1981; J.D.,
University of Virginia, 1985. The author acknowledges the most helpful comments of Professors
Stephen Bainbridge, William Carney, Allred Cunard, Michael Dooley, Allan Farnsworth, Saul
Levmore, Jonathan Macey, Marleen O'Connor, Marc Steinberg and Michael Swygert. He addi-
tionally thanks Bill Cook, Tripp Gulliford and Angelo Patacca tier their excellent research assis-
tance.
I See, e.g., Debate; Readers and Authors Face Off Over HBR's Last Issue; CEO Pay: How Much
is Enough?, MARV. Bus. REV., Judy-Aug. 1992, at ISO [hereinafter Debate); Amanda Bennett, A
Little Pain and a Lot to Gain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at RI; Amanda Bennett, Voices of Protest,
WALL ST.", Apr. 22, 1992, at R6; Tommy Denton, Where is the justice in Bloated Executive Bonuses?,
L.A. DAILY J., May 14, 1991, at 6.
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amounts executives of foreign competitors receive, particularly in re-
lation to the spread between the salaries of the highest and lowest paid
employees? It is argued that U.S. executives are being compensated at
an alarmingly high and dramatically escalating rate, despite the fact
that domestic corporations may be performing less efficiently and less
profitably than similarly situated foreign enterprises. 3 What are the
legal ramifications of this executive compensation issue and is there a
need for some sort of legal response?
The controversy is not a new one. In the mid-1930s, a similar
public debate emerged over what was then considered to be the ex-
traordinarily high compensation levels of certain corporate executives.
While acknowledging that a corporate board may be responsible for
salaries paid to executives that exceeded compensation for services
rendered and thus became actionable "waste" or improper gifts of
corporate assets, the courts generally declined to intervene. 4 It was
believed that a court was no better at valuing an executive's worth than
a properly functioning board, and therefore judicial review would be
fruitless.5 With the judiciary a reluctant venue for compensation re-
form, Congress attempted to resolve the issue by dramatically raising
2 In 1991, the average chief executive of a large corporation was paid approximately 109
times the average factory employee's wage. In 1980, the average chief executive earned only 42
times the average factory worker's wage. John A. Byrne, What, Me. Overpaid? CEOs Fight Back,
Bus. Wit., May 4, 1992, at 142, 143. See also RonEttr A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 170 (1991) (observing that executive overcompensation has a negative effect
on employee morale); Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to
Controlling Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 69-71 (1992); Jonathan Rowe, CEO Pay Affects Company
Morale, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 12, 1992, at 13.
s Roberto Goizueta, Chairman of Coca Cola, recently received over $80,000,000 in restricted
stock for his services to the company. Anthony O'Reilly, the retiring chief executive officer of HJ.
Heinz, was paid $75,085,000 in compensation for 1991. And for the same year, Leon Hirsch,
chairman of U.S. Surgical Corp., received $23,281,000. See Byrne, supra note 2, at 142. Can any
one executive's services be worth that much to the corporation? The tenor of the varied articles
discussing the phenomenon suggests not. See supra note 1.
4 See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591-92 (1933) (ruling that bonus payments to
executives which have no relation to the value of services rendered are gifts of corporate property,
and remanding to the trial court to determine whether payments constituted a waste of corporate
assets); Seitz v. Union Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 189 N.W. 586, 587-88 (Minn. 1922) (explaining
that courts should proceed with caution when determining whether salaries are excessive and
unreasonable; courts are not called upon to make a yearly audit and adjust salaries); Catlin v.
National City Bank, 281 N.Y.S. 795, 802-03 (Sup. CL 1935) (ruling that the magnitude of the
total compensation received by officers does not, by itself, entitle plaintiffs to recover, but merely
requires an investigation by court as to whether a cause of action exists and leaves the burden of
proof on the plaintiffs); Barris, supra note 2, at 81-83; Detlev Vagts, Challenges to Executive Over
Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 252-55 (1983).
5 Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679-80 (Sup. Ct. 1941) ("Courts are ill-equipped to solve
or even to grapple with these entangled economic problems."), affd mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App.
Div. 1941).
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the income taxation rates imposed on those receiving the greatest
compensation.6 No legal changes, however, in internal corporate gov-
ernance procedures were enacted. Following this taxation-based re-
sponse, the issue basically lay dormant until the perceived salary ex-
cesses of the late 1980s revived public interest and debate.
Although some may argue that through efficient market function,
either few executives are overcompensated or that market-based forces
will act to limit salary excesses,'' there is a compensation problem today
that, for various reasons to be discussed below, is not responsive to a
market-based solution. The best way to encourage reasonable compen-
sation without discouraging effective executive performance centers
on better internal corporate oversight. Such oversight may come only
from an unfettered, unbiased, independent board of directors. This
article proposes two reforms in corporate board structure to encourage
such independence of judgment that will result in the proper review
of executive compensation procedures. First, the outside directors
should be compensated solely in company stock. Second, directors'
term lengths should be significantly expanded. These internal struc-
tural changes will result in a more effective board-level review of ex-
ecutive compensation and should lead to more reasonable compensa-
tion schemes.
Unfortunately, as this article will discuss, most commentators ex-
amining the compensation issue have not focused on reform of the
internal corporate governance procedures that created the problem.
Rather, they have proposed externally-based solutions that will either
prove ineffective or hinder effective corporate management. Indeed,
the regulatory and legislative communities have been quickest to re-
spond, offering varying responses to the overcompensation problem.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, probably seeking to stimu-
6 1 GEORGE T. WASIONGTON & V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, 2ND, COMPENSATING 'Elle CORPORATE
ExEctyrivit 9 & n.32, 10-11 (1951).
7 See, e.g., Robert Thomas, Is Corporate Executive Compensation Excessive?, in TIIE ATTACK ON
CORPORATE AMERICA 276, 278 (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) ("Competition among corporations
, , , sets the level of executive compensation."); Daniel R. Fische], The Corporate Governance
Movement, 35 VANH. L. REV. 1259, 1263, 1283 (1982) ("[M]arket consiraints . . . may be more
effective in setting salaries than a committee of uninformed independent directors."); Nicholas
Wolfson, A Critique of Corporate Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 959, 975-78 (1980) ("excessive"
compensation is eliminated by market forces, including competition for executive positions);
Alisa J. Baker, Stock Options—A Perk that Built Silicon Valley, WALL. ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A20;
Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Congress?
Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 2B (arguing that executives are paid in line
with performance and their pay should not be cut); Kevin J. Murphy, Tap Executives are Worth
Every Nickel They Get, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar: Apr. 1986, at 125 (arguing that current compensation
policies encourage managers to act in the best interests of company shareholders).
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late a shareholder response to the issue, has taken a two-flanked ap-
proach. The first, adopted in early 1992 during the height of the proxy
season, loosened the restrictions on placing shareholder-initiated pro-
posals on compensation issues on corporate ballots.' The second, in-
itially released as proposed amendments to the proxy rules and later
adopted with some revisions, expanded the amount of disclosure com-
panies must provide to their shareholders on the amounts their top
executives are paid.' The Congress, on the recommendation of Presi-
dent Clinton, chose an historic tax-based response to the problem. In
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Congress mandated that cor-
porations may no longer deduct, as a business expense, any compen-
sation to an executive in excess of $1 million per annum that is not
related to performance)° Additionally, a new "millionaires" surtax has
been imposed on incomes in excess of two hundred fifty thousand
dollars per year."
Shareholder Communications Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29562, 56 Fed. Reg.
41,635 (SEC 1991). The SEC revised the proposal in 1992. Regulation of Communications Among
Seeurityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30849, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,564 (SEC 1992).
9
 One of the elements of the SEC proposal, and later adopted in rule form, required
companies to compare, in graphic form, the company's performance with the amount of com-
pensation its executives received. Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release Nos.
33-6940 & 34-30851, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582 (SEC 1992); Executive Compensation Disclosure,
Exchange Act Release No. 6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (SEC 1992).
"'Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
This bill prohibits publicly held corporations from deducting executive compensation in excess
of one million dollars per annum. Id. However, corporations that tie compensation to perform-
ance may be able to continue to deduct the entire amount of compensation. In order to qualify
for this performance-based compensation exception, corporations must meet five basic require-
ments: 1) executive compensation must be made according to a previously established perform-
ance based goal; 2) the performance goal may not be altered following its establishment; 3) such
a plan must be approved by a board committee that is comprised of at least two outside directors;
4) the material terms of the plan must be disclosed to and ratified by stockholders prior to the
payment of compensation; and 5) the committee must certify satisfaction of the performance
goals prior to the payment of compensation. Id. Thus, corporations may avoid the deduction
limitation by either following these guidelines, shifting a portion of compensation into stock
options, 'which arc generally considered 'performance based'" or making payments to a qualified
retirement plan. Kathryn Jones, Tax Law Expected to Bring Little Shift in Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1993, at Cl, C2. Consequently, some commentators and corporate executives have
suggested that these new deduction limitations will in actuality have only a limited impact upon
most corporate executive compensation schemes. Id.
L L
 H.R. 2264. The bill, which both the House and Senate passed by the narrowest of margins,
imposes a ten percent surtax upon individuals with taxable income in excess of the applicable
threshold of two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Id. See also Jackie Calmes, With Signature,
President Will Erase Reagan's Legacy, WALL Sr. J., Aug. 9, 1993, at A4. During the presidential
campaign, President Clinton proposed implementing a "millionaires" surtax upon individuals
with incomes in excess of one million dollars. See President-Elect Clinton Foresees Change in Plan
for Middle-Class Mx Break, 10 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) D-4 Jan. 15, 1993). However, President
Clinton subsequently lowered this ceiling and proposed imposing a ten percent surtax upon
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A debate is also occurring within the academic community. De-
spite the traditional reluctance of courts to involve themselves in com-
pensation disputes, a few commentators have called for increasing
judicial activism in reviewing questionable compensation schemes.' 2
Given the present interest in both the legal and financial communities
in the emerging power of institutional investors, some academics have
suggested an institutional investor-based solution to the problem.
Should the institutions eschew their traditional passivity and take a
greater interest in the management of the companies in which they
invest, they may act as a powerful force in preventing executive over-
compensation.' 3
Although each of these approaches is not without some merit, this
article will argue that they are "solutions" that will either cause more
harm than good, or effect little change in the present state of affairs
which, given the level of public discontent, cannot be ignored. The
problem of executive overcompensation is best dealt with not at the
regulatory or even shareholder level, but by focusing on that body
traditionally charged with responsibility for corporate oversight—the
board of directors. It is the board which must approve all executive
compensation. Thus, it is the board which must act to rein in overzeal-
ous and overcompensated management. Some commentators have
suggested that only by strengthening the power and independence of
the board's compensation committee will the issue be successfully
resolved." Such tampering, however, is not the solution. In large pub-
licly-traded companies, where the compensation crisis is most manifest,
no major shareholder or group of shareholders controls the activities
individuals with incomes in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars per annum. Under the
new tax code, the effective tax rate for individuals with incomes in excess of two hundred fifty
thousand dollars per year has risen to 39.6 percent. H.R. 2269.
12 Vagts, supra note 4, at 275-76; Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the
Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41 BUFF. L. REv. I, 79-83 (1993); Richard L. Shorten, jr., Note,
An Overview of the Revolt Against Executive Compensation, 45 RurcEits L.J. 121, 159-61 (1992).
13 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L REA/, 895, 915-17 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Empirical Evidence); Kevin G.
Salwen & Joann S. Lublin, Activist Holders: Giant Investors Flex Their Muscles More at U.S.
Corporations, WALL. Sr. Apr. 27, 1992, at Al.
14 See Lance Berger, 'New Initiatives for the Compensation Committee, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Winter 1985, at 33; James W. Fisher, Jr., Crafting Policy for Performance and Rewards, DIRECTORS
& BOARDS, Winter 1986, at 26. See also Alison L. Cowan, Board Room Back-Scratching?, N.Y. Timm,
June 2, 1992, at Cl (noting that the leaders of various companies often sit on each others'
compensation committees and, as such, set pay fisr one another). Some large institutional
investors are proposing that shareholders be allowed to vote on the selection of compensation
consultants used by boards to set executive compensation. Gilbert Fuchsberg, Investors May Seek
Vote on Executive Pay Consultants, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1992, at Bl.
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of the enterprise because of the sheer size of the operation and atomis-
tic shareholding patterns. Rather, corporate management controls the
business. The board is not representative of any one shareholder or
shareholder group, but is picked by and responsive to the leading
officers of the corporation. This phenomenon may be described as the
"captured board" syndrome. 16 In a captured board, the directors, re-
sponsible for oversight, are generally either the officers themselves
(inside directors); participants in enterprises retained by management,
such as law firms, and investment banks (inside "outside" directors);
or social or business acquaintances of the top executives, most likely
the top officers of other corporations, on whose boards the chief
executive officers may sit ("outside" directors).' 6 Although such board
composition may lead to affable board gatherings, the oversight func-
tion may be severely compromised. Even if the compensation commit-
tee (which determines compensation levels) itself is composed exclu-
sively of "outside" directors, both economic and psychological ties to
management exist that preclude exercise of truly independent judg-
ment. Theoretically, the threat of legal liability should ensure unen-
cumbered judgment, but, as a matter of practice, the protection af-
forded by the business judgment rule and concomitant reliance on
"captured" outside consultants counters any potential prophylactic
effect. A compensation committee is only as effective as its members.
If the outside directors comprising it are beholden in any respect to
management, whether by economic or psychic ties, the committee will
not function as the panacea.
The solution lies in loosening the outside directors' ties to man-
agement and recreating a vital and independent board, which will
engage in active oversight, not passive agreement. A way must be found
to reinvigorate the outside director who traditionally acted in the
shareholders' interests by directing management. Some commentators
have argued that this may be accomplished by placing representatives
of the corporation's major institutional shareholders on the board."
16 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 139-48 (1976). See
generally MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1986).
16 See Avery S. Cohen, The Outside Director--Selection, Responsibilities, and Contribution to the
Public Corporation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rim 837, 837 (1977) (classifying directors as Inside
directors, non-independent outside directors, and independent outside directors"); Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-20 (1978) (describing directors as management
and non-management directors); but see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 1.29 (A.L.I.)
(Tentative Draft No. 11, 1991) (abandoning the use of labels, but defining when a director has
a "significant relationship" with a company's senior executives).
17 See Jayne W Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37 (1990)
(arguing that the proxy rules should be modified so that it is easier for shareholders to elect
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They reason that because these individuals attained their board posi-
tions as a result of their relationship to the shareholding institutions
and not to management, they will act in the shareholders' best inter-
ests, independent of management's This approach is problematic in
one major respect. It assumes that the institutions will bond together
to elect their representatives and that the institutions possess sufficient
voting power to place enough directors in office to gain control over
the hoard.
There is, however, a much simpler and more effective way to
reposition the board to act as a counter-force to management, and
resolve the perceived compensation crisis. The outside directors must
be made to consider management proposals from the perspective of
the equity-holders to whom they are legally responsible, and not from
the viewpoint of one engaged by and beholden to management. After
all, they were elected to their positions as the representatives of the
shareholders, not the officers. The best way to create this perspective
may be to appeal directly to these directors' pecuniary interests. To
ensure that they will examine a management initiative in the best
interests of the stockholders, we must make them shareholders as well.
Frequently, however, outside directors do own stock in the corpo-
rations on whose boards they sit. Yet, they are still subject to manage-
ment capture. Why? It is because their equity positions in the compa-
nies are insubstantial compared with the monetary and reputational
compensation they receive for serving on the board. Financially, it is
far better to side with management and not risk failing to be renomi-
nated and receiving the compensation and prestige a board seat
brings, than to act independently and face removal. If, however, one's
personal financial interest in the corporation's stock exceeded the
annual compensation and prestige value of board membership, one
would be less willing to side automatically with management. Self-in-
terest is obviously tied to board behavior, and if a director's self-interest
is aligned with the equity-holders, as opposed to management, then
the compensation problem, and maybe even the whole issue of man-
agement capture, might be solved. But how do we place significant
equity positions in the hands of the outside directors?
outside directors); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor
Voice, 30 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents] (arguing that regulations should
be relaxed so that particular institutions may be permitted to own 5-10% of certain companies).
See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) (calling for institutional investors to organize
a core of professional directors).
18 Black, Agents, supra note 17, at 842-44.
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This article proposes that corporations should pay their directors
their annual fees in restricted company stock. In a few years, each
outside director will have accumulated a reasonably substantial portfo-
lio and, therefore, will possess a powerful financial incentive to act
more independently of management. Additionally, directors' term
lengths must be significantly expanded both to ensure that their equity
positions (or potential positions) will reach the levels necessary to
influence their decision-making and to mitigate the chilling effect of
a management threat not to renominate that frequent elections create.
Of course, the linchpin to the effectiveness of this approach is the
assumption that stock ownership has a salutary impact on individual
behavior—that significant stock ownership does make for a director
less susceptible to management capture. An empirical examination of
the voting behavior of boards comprised of outside directors with
substantial stockholdings, compared with boards with outside mem-
bers who do not, should confirm the validity of the approach. This
article undertakes such an examination. In the realm of executive
compensation, it appears that companies with boards composed of
outside directors with significant shareholdings are less susceptible to
the charge of executive overcompensation than companies without
such boards. In fact, an apparent relationship exists between the way
companies are regarded by the financial community in terms of the
fairness of executive compensation, and the levels of outside director
stock ownership. Those companies that are viewed as having high
levels of executive compensation tend to have fewer outside directors
with significant holdings in the business. On the other hand, those
businesses with levels of executive pay considered to be in line with
services rendered tend to have a greater number of outside directors
with significant equity holdings. An alignment of the directors' inter-
ests with those of the shareholders, rather than with management,
through the development of substantial equity holdings which results
in more effective oversight, would explain this phenomenon. Director
stock ownership may not prove the comprehensive cure to the over-
compensation controversy and related captured board syndrome—but
it may have a strong salutary effect and certainly would be a good
beginning.
Part I of this article examines the question of overcompensation.
Are U.S. executives overpaid, and, if so, can the market itself act to
correct any imbalances? For reasons to be discussed, I think the market
cannot. Part II considers the various solutions proffered, including
heightened disclosure, tax-based remedies, judicial involvement, insti-
tutional shareholder activism, and strengthened board compensation
September 1993]	 EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION	 945
committees. These approaches are critiqued as either ineffective or
causing more harm than good to ultimate shareholder and national
interests. Part III focuses on stock ownership and lengthened board
terms as the preferred response to the problem of overcompensation.
Finally, this article examines the link between substantial equity hold-
ings and better oversight and proposes that companies create such
holdings in their outside directors. This proposal should eventually
result in more effective board oversight, reasonable market-based com-
pensation schemes, and healthier, more competitive corporations.
I. THE' OVERCOMPENSATION PROBLEM
A. Is There Overcompensation?
Before embarking on a quest to determine an appropriate solu-
tion to a perceived inequity, it must first be determined that a problem
exists which requires an active response. In other words, are U.S.
executives overcompensated and, if so, is extraordinary action neces-
sary to remedy the situation? The problem with examining compensa-
tion is that the entire inquiry begs the question—for what is the true
value of the deployment of human capital? Unlike determining the
cost of providing a physical good based upon known variables, there
is really no mechanistic process for quantifying the value of human
labor. If it were merely the cost of the basic human needs of food,
clothing and shelter, we would all be compensated similarly.''' However,
we are not. Although human effort is in one sense easily quantifiable
by being limited to the physical capacities of the human being and the
time limitations of the twenty-four-hour day, human capital is highly
differentiated. The tasks required to maintain an advanced economy
are extraordinarily varied and require vastly different skills. Some skills
are seemingly more valuable to society than others and, as a result, are
compensated at higher levels. What those levels may be are determined
through the routine function of the market.
How much individuals are compensated for their labors is the
I 9 As Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels stated:
The average price of wage labor is the minimum wage, i.e., that quantum of the
means of subsistence which is absolutely requisite to keep the laborer in bare
existence as a laborer .... We by no means intend to abolish this personal appro-
priation of the products of labor . . . . All that we want to do away with is the
miserable character of this appropriation ... .
Manifesto of the Communist Party, in MARX & ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS & PHILOSO-
PHY 22 (Lewis S. Feuer cd., 1959).
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result of an implicit or explicit bargaining process. One party has labor
to offer and another has a need for the skill. The resulting compensa-
tion is the product of the matching of expectations—what one expects
to receive and what the other is willing to give. These expectations,
created through routine market function, determine compensation
levels. What others are giving or receiving for similar tasks produces
the expectations that determine particular compensation levels for
particular skills. The "value" of a particular skill is not implicit in the
skill itself but, rather, is simply the result of this bargaining process. In
this regard, there is really no such thing as an implicitly "fair" salary—
only one that is acceptable to both parties.
This is the real problem with discussions concerning "overcom-
pensation," for if a salary is the result of an active bargaining process
can such compensation ever be considered excessive? Because there is
no truly objective standard for valuing human capital other than
through the operation of the market driven by active bargaining, the
reasonableness of a particular compensation arrangement is objec-
tively indeterminable. Reasonableness is the product of the bargain.
For example, who can say that an employee is overcompensated if two
willing parties agree that the efforts of one of them are worth one
million dollars? If one is voluntarily willing to part with capital to obtain
a particular service, that is the value of the service. The compensation
is thus reasonable. Compensation becomes unreasonable when it is not
the product of balanced bargaining. Where one party to a bargain, due
to external pressures, is unable or unwilling to bargain effectively to
maximize self-interest, then the resulting agreement may be unreason-
able.
In the corporate setting, the executive bargains with the corpora-
tion for compensation. The executive possesses managerial skills that
the corporation desires. The corporation possesses capital that the
executive desires in exchange for services rendered. How much capital
will be parted with for these services is the result of bargaining. The
resulting salary may be problematic where effective bargaining does
not take place because one party does not attempt to maximize its own
self-interest. This is the crux of the overcompensation dispute. Execu-
tive salary arrangements are the products of negotiation between the
executive and the company's board of directors who represent the
interests of the company and its owners, the shareholders. If the board
is reluctant to bargain effectively with management because, despite
its fiduciary obligations, it believes itself to be more closely allied with
management than the shareholders, then the product of such a "bar-
gain" may be no bargain at all to the corporation and its owners.
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Alliances between bargaining parties may result in acquiescence rather
than bargained-for agreement. Salary arrangements that result from
such a one-sided bargaining process may be susceptible to charges of
excess.
Although the popular media focuses simply on the large executive
salaries themselves as proof of the existence of an overcompensation
problem, the problem actually involves the process by which these
salaries were determined and not the dollar amount. A lucrative salary,
either standing on its own or in comparison with other salaries paid
within the organization, is not in and of itself proof that the recipient
has been overcompensated. As long as the compensation was the
product of an active, good-faith bargaining process between the board
and the executive, the salary cannot be characterized as unreasonable.
Negotiation, motivated by self-interest on both sides, assures proper
compensation. There is really nothing improper about an executive's
compensation if a board determines that the services rendered are
highly valuable to the corporation and offering a high salary is the only
way to retain that executive.
Compensation amounts do become problematic, however, when
a board, beholden to a particular executive, agrees to a salary package
upon demand, in the absence of self-interested bargaining. The failure
to actively negotiate an executive's compensation request is most likely
to occur in corporations where the directors are not obligated to any
particular shareholder or shareholder block, but gain and maintain
their board seats because of executive largesse. This situation generally
exists in companies that, due to their large size and consequent atomis-
tic shareholding patterns, are controlled by incumbent management
and not by one shareholder or group of shareholders. 2 D In such busi-
nesses, the boards of directors generally consist of management and
those appointed by management. In these situations, it is unwise for
the outside directors to actively challenge the executives who have
placed them in office:2 ' Such directors have little incentive, other than
fiduciary duty (which for reasons to be discussed has proven ineffective
20 As of December 31, 1974, management controlled 165 of the 200 largest, publicly-owned,
nonfinancial corporations in the United States. EDWARD S. HERMAN, CORPORATE CONTROL,
CORPORATE POWER 58 (1981) (Table 3.2). "[W]ide diffusion tot.' stock) does not increase the
power of holders of small blocks of stock; it enhances the power of whoever controls the proxy
machinery." Id. at 53. See also MACE, supra note 15, at 83-84. See generally ADDLE A. BERLE, JR.,
Se GARDINER C. MEANS, Tile MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47-118 (1933).
21 Eismnint6, supra note 15, at 147.
[I]n life as in law the power to hire implies the power to fire. A director who has
been brought on the board by a chief executive—as outside directors typically
are—is therefore likely to regard himself as serving at the latter's sufferance.
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in creating incentive), to bargain actively with management over com-
pensation.
Many of the largest U.S. public corporations have shareholding
ownership patterns that dispose them to such potential management
capture and attendant compensation problems." It is these companies
which have traditionally paid their executives the largest salaries and
are 'currently the target of popular scrutiny." A large salary is not in
and of itself malignant. However, a significant executive compensation
package paid by a large public corporation subject to management
capture, may be indicative, because of its size, of a failure by the
directors to have bargained effectively. Such compensation may thus
be overcompensation. Because of the rapid escalation in executive
compensation scales in the U.S. and in the large number of companies
whose boards do not report to a controlling shareholder group, it is
clear that a strong potential for overcompensation may exist."
The difficulty with attempting to measure the adequacy of com-
pensation is the highly subjective nature of the entire matter. This is
why the courts have traditionally been reluctant to open their dockets
to salary disputes. There are too many ways of measuring compensa-
tion and related performance." What by one standard is excessive, may
Id.; see also HERMAN, supra note 20, at 30-48; MONKS & MINOW, supra note 2, at 73-79; Victor
Brudney, The Independent Diredor
—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597,
607-39 (1982); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 873-76 ("All too often ... outside directors
.. turn out to be more independent of shareholders than they are of management."). This
situation may be changing. In October 1992, the outside directors of General Motors fired their
CEO in response to the company's lackluster performance. See Paul Ingrassia, Board Reform
Replaces the LBO, WALL ST, J., Oct. 30, 1992, at A14. See also JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTEN-
TATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17-31 (1989) (noting that while the CEO
still controls the director nomination process, boards are beginning to have greater participation
in the process); Thomas A. Stewart, The King is Dead, FORTUNE, Jan. II, 1993, at 34 (discussing
recent firings and forced resignations of company CEOs); Stuart Mieher, Firms Restrict CEOs in
Picking Board Members, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1993, at B1 (reporting survey which indicates that
many companies now prohibit corporate insiders from nominating new directors).
22 See HERMAN, supra note 20, at 70-85.
23
 See, e.g., MONKS & MINOW, supra note 2, at 166 (explaining that in 1989, the average CEO
at top 200 companies received $2.8 million in salary and bonuses); Arch Patton, Those Million-
Dollar-a- Year Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION : A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990s 43,
44 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (noting that executive pay in the 100 largest publicly-owned
corporations increased by an average of 13.7% in 1983); Executive Compensation Scoreboard, Bus.
WK., May 4, 1992, at 148-62 (rating executive pay among 500 largest U.S. companies).
24 See supra note 2. See also MONKS & MINOW, supra note 2, at 166-67 (noting that U.S.
executive pay significantly outpaced inflation, wage, and profits rates from 1977 to 1987 and that
American CEOs in billion-dollar companies receive two to three times the pay of comparable
executives in Europe and Japan).
25
 Statistics describing compensation levels do not give a complete picture of an executive's
compensation package. In addition to salary and incentive awards, executive compensation often
September 19931	 EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION	 949
be by another perfectly reasonable. This is what accounts for the
tremendous division within the financial community over who is being
overpaid and who is not. 26 The only way to judge a compensation
package objectively is through the same process by which businesses
themselves are assigned value—through the operation of routine mar-
ket forces, characterized by active bargaining. Given the potential for
subdued bargaining and coincident overcompensation in the largest
corporations, coupled with rapidly accelerating salary scales in the face
of a national economic recession, it is not surprising that the popular
media have sounded an alarm. Although it is very difficult to look at
a specific salary and immediately reach an informed conclusion as to
its excessiveness, the great potential for abuse mandates the formula-
don of a prophylactic response.
B. The Inadequacy of a Market -Based Response
Some argue that even if an overcompensation problem does exist,
no external response need be forthcoming. The ordinary operation of
the markets themselves will provide the solution. If the compensation
scheme in a particular company is unreasonable, then market forces
will punish that enterprise in the form of a lower stock price. The
lessened equity value will, in turn, force the board to bargain more
effectively for reduced salary levels to avoid revolt and replacement by
enraged shareholders. Under this model, a market-induced decline in
share values will encourage shareholder rebellion sufficient to compel
a traditionally management-allied board to reconsider its compensa-
tion bargaining strategy. As a result, no externally-based approach to
the compensation problem is necessary. The situation will take care of
itself.
This approach may be seriously flawed despite_its strong logical
appeal. It is based entirely on the problematic assumption that unrea-
includes executive stock plans with company-arranged financing, use of company aircraft and
automobiles, financial, tax, and estate counselling, retirement benefits, life insurance, and intan-
gibles, such as the power to designate firms with which the company does business, that increase
the executive's prestige and power. V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD, 2ND & ARTHUR D. SPORN, EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION 1-2 (1984).
Most executive compensation plans attempt to align an executive's rate of compensation
with the company's performance in various areas, most predominantly stock prices and profits.
See Seymour Burchman, Choosing Appropriate Performance Measures, in EXECUTIVE CommisA-
TION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990s 189 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991); Stephen F. O'Byrne,
Linking Management Performance Incentives to Shareholder Wealth, J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN., Autumn
1991 at 91; S. Prakash Sethi & Nobuaki Namiki, Factoring Innovation Into Top Management's
Compensation, Dina:Tons & BOARDS, Winter 1986, at 21.
26 See supra notes 1 and 7.
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sonable executive salary levels will result in lower equity prices. Al-
though high salaries may indicate a lax bargaining environment
between the board and the company's top executives regarding com-
pensation practices, the harm to the company itself may appear insig-
nificant in a macro view. To a multibillion dollar corporation, a few
million more dollars paid to its top management than may actually be
necessary to retain their services has little bearing on that business's
overall profitability. In this sense, the alleged overcompensation may
be statistically insignificant. To a business earning $250,000,000, a
million dollar overpayment to an executive, while a spectacular wind-
fall to that individual, is insignificant in evaluating the company's
earnings. 27
Many techniques are used to value a business. Analysts consider
such factors as price/earnings ratios, debt to equity computations,
projected earnings streams, resale value, and break-up potential,
among others, to determine the going equity value of an enterprise. 28
While an executive's compensation is of major concern to that individ-
ual, in a large organization it has little impact on any of the common
valuation methods because of its small relative scale. The actual effect
of an excessive salary on the company's earnings or even its total asset
base is likely to be minimal, if not minuscule. 29
 Therefore, even, if an
executive has been grossly overpaid, the impact on the company's stock
price will be negligible because the market places its heaviest emphasis
in valuation on "the bottom line," whether that may involve earnings,
assets or liabilities." For a "market-based" solution to the compensation
27 But see Debate, supra note 1, at 133 (Michael S. Kesner, National Director on Compensation
and Benefits at the accounting firm of Arthur Andersen, states that "[A] $5 million CEO pay
package on the bottom line of a $2 billion sales company is clearly not the issue."). As Former
Illinois Senator Everett M. Dirksen remarked, "A billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon
you're talking about real money." RESPECTFULLY QUOTED 155 (Suzy Platt ed., 1989).
Re Analysts use four main methods to value companies. Discounted cash flow analysis ("DCF")
essentially states that the value of a company is reflected in the profits the company will earn over
a projected period of time. With the comparable company method, analysts compare the business
to be valued with companies possessing similar financial and operational profiles. With the
comparable acquisitions method, the value of a business is based on the cost of acquiring similar
businesses. Liquidation analysis determines the company's value based on the prices the com-
pany's assets could be sold for in an orderly manner. Analysts apply combinations and variations
of these methods when valuing a company. Roiliaa L. Kuitx, INVESTMENT BANKING 97-123
(1990). See also Brian H. Saffer, Touching All Bases in Setting Merger Prices, MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS, Fall 1984, at 42 (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the four methods).
29 Most valuation analyses do not separately address the executive's compensation. See supra
note 28.
"See Brownstein & Fanner, supra note 7, at 29 ('The question is not 'Are executives paid
too much?' The real question is 'Are shareholders getting their money's worth from their
executives?'").
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problem to be effective, overcompensation must have a reasonably
significant impact on the equity value of a company to force a board
response.
The market functioning alone will provide no certain remedy,
because the problem seems to merit little market attention.m Still, a
response is warranted. Even if an executive is overpaid only a single
dollar, that dollar rightfully belongs to the shareholders, not the ex-
ecutive. In our system of criminal justice, the amount that an individual
takes wrongfully is unimportant in adjudging potential criminal re-
sponsibility. The mere fact that an unlawful gain occurred is the basis
for action. So must a response in the corporate arena be similarly
forthcoming? While an unreasonable compensation scheme may, in
and of itself, have little impact on overall corporate performance, it
may also indicate a much broader problem that should demand an
immediate response. An overcompensated executive is indicative of an
inattentive board whose neglect may result in far more dire conse-
quences for corporate profitability than a simple excessive salary
scheme." Inattention to this problem will ultimately result in a runaway
management which may lead to corporate disaster. By the time com-
pany profits have decreased to such a level as to warrant a market-based
response, the damage to the business and shareholder wealth will have
already been done. If the loss to the corporation of its market share
and reputation are severe enough, the damage may be irreversibly
crippling and perhaps even fatal to the enterprise. An active, non-mar-
ket-based response is therefore required.
II. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENTLY PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As the controversy over compensation has grown, proposals to
solve the problem have proliferated as well. The governmental and
legal communities have offered several dramatically differing solutions.
These well-intentioned approaches miss the mark. They appear to
31 Compensation commentator Graef Crystal concedes that a CEO's pay package does not
significantly influence stock values, but argues that investors should consider both the amount
of an executive's pay as well as the mechanisms by which he is paid in order to make an intelligent
investment decision. GRAM , S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS 253-64 (1991).
s2 The consequences of an inattentive board and the resulting benefits of an activist board
are best illustrated by the recent turmoil at General Motors. Throughout its history, the GM board
was typically beholden to GM management, with board meetings being little more than social
gatherings in which the CEO's agenda was approved. After a long, steady decline during which
GM's share of the American car market dropped from 52% to 35%, the GM board finally took
affirmative steps to improve the company's performance, steps which included firing GM's CEO,
Robert Stempel. See John Greenwald, What Went Wrong?, TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 42, 44.
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attack the manifestation of the problem without targeting its root
cause—passive bargaining resulting from inactive boards. These pro-
posals will either prove ineffective or may even act to compound the
damage to corporate health that overcompensation creates.
A. Heightened Disclosure
The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") has devel-
oped a two-tiered approach to the issue. This approach involves a
reexamination of the way the proxy rules deal with executive compen-
sation questions and it will have about as much effect on the problem
as aspirin provides for the common cold. It may make us feel a bit
better, but the offending virus remains. First, the SEC has liberalized
its stance on permitting shareholders' resolutions regarding executive
compensation onto the annual meeting ballot. Traditionally, such pro-.
posals were excluded as a matter of policy. Under Rule 14a-8(C) (7) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, resolutions that dealt "with
a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations
of the registrant" were excludable." Resolutions relating to compensa-
tion were said to fall within this category. In early 1992, however, the
SEC amended its policy and announced that it would no longer permit
the wholesale exclusion of such proposals, as long as they targeted top
executive compensation and not ordinary managerial compensation
policy. 34
 At least ten shareholder proposals calling for compensation
Recently, a number of formerly passive boards have become increasingly active and have
removed from office managers who were previously untouchable. For example, Paul E. Lego, the
Chairman and CEO of Westinghouse, resigned his post in response to mounting charges of
inadequate corporate financial performance and growing concern about management effective-
ness amongst the company's directors. Stuart Mieher, Westinghouse's Paul E. Lego Resigns as Chief
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 1993, at A3, A6. IBM's CEO and Chairman John F. Akers was forced into
retirement as the company saw its stock price lose half of its value within a six-month time frame:
the corporation was forced to make a 55% cut in its quarterly dividend, and recorded a $4.97
billion loss in 1992. Michael W. Miller & Laurence Hooper, Signing Off Akers Quits at IBM Under
Heavy Pressure; Dividend Is Slashed,•WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1993, at Al, A6.
In the past 18 months, 13 Fortune 500 corporate CEOs have either resigned, been fired, or
been asked by their directors to prepare for departure. Prominent among Lego's and Aker's
colleagues: Nicholas J. Nicholas, Jr., Time Warner; Tom H. Barrett, Goodyear; James D. Robinson
DI, American Express; Kenneth H. Olsen, Digital Equipment; Joseph R. Carrion, Compaq Com-
puter; and James L. Ketelsen, Tenneco. Stewart, supra note 21, at 34, 35-36, 40.
53 17	 § 240.14a-8(c) (7) (1992). Rule 14a-8(c) (7) states:
(c) The registrant may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from
its proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(7) If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary
business operations of the registrant.
34
 Kevin G. Salwen, Shareholder Proposals On Pay Must be Aired, SEC to Tell 10 Firms, WALL
ST. J„ Feb. 13, 1992, at Al.
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limitations were allowed onto proxy ballots. None, however, was ulti-
mately successful."
The second tier of the SEC's response to the compensation issue
involves increased public disclosure of executive salary arrangements.
In June, 1992, the SEC proposed sweeping changes in the type and
amount of disclosure that must be made to the public by reporting
corporations in the executive pay area. The reasoning behind the
proposals was ostensibly "to improve shareholders' understanding of
all forms of compensation paid to senior executives and directors, the
criteria used by the board of directors in reaching compensation deci-
sions, and the degree of relationship between compensation and cor-
porate performance."' Three new disclosure requirements were pro-
posed. First, all compensation paid to certain senior executives was to
be reported to the public in the form of a "Summary Compensation
Table" which would "show both annual and long-term compensation
in a single, comprehensive overview." 37 Second, the board's Compen-
sation Committee would be directed to prepare a report "on the
corporate performance factors that it relied on in making specific
compensation awards for reporting executives, as well as describe the
general policies of the committee in determining senior executive
compensation."' Third, the reporting corporation would be required
to prepare an annual "Performance Graph" 39 to aid in shareholder
evaluation of the effectiveness of corporate performance in relation-
ship to compensation practices. This graph would set forth the cumu-
lative total return to shareholders of the registrant over a period of at
least the previous five years, together with the comparable return to
"The ten proposals and the percentage of shares voted in ihvor of each motion are: IBM:
improved disclosure of officer pay, 16.7% shares; Baltimore Gas & Elecuic: cap executive pay at
'0x average worker's salary, 12.2% shares; Eastman Kodak: disclose executive severance packages,
15.9% shares; Equimark: tic executive severance pay to company performance, 16.5% shares; Bell
Atlantic: end management short-tcrm bonus plan, 10.9% shares; Black Hills Corp.: eliminate
director's retirement plan, 36.9% shares; Chrysler: disallow revaluing of stock options, 5.6%
shares; Aetna: cut director's pay for failure to attend board meetings, 7.5% shares; Battle Moun-
tain Gold: cut executive pay 30% and end stock options until profit recovers, not on ballot;
Reebok: establish compensation committee of independent directors, 19.2% shares. Executive
Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 6940, 57 Fed. Reg. 29,582, 29,583 (July 2,
1992); Rtiictunt Urn., MAR. 30, 1992, Pxoxv STATEMENT (1992); Battle Mountain Gold Sees
Possible Loss, Rani:Hs, Apr. 21, 1992, available in LEX1S, Nexis Library, Reuters File; Salwen,
supra note 34, at Al 2. See also . ' sulith 14. Dobrzynski, A Ground Swell Builds for 'None of the Above,
Bus. WK., May 11, 1992, at 34 (observing that many shareholders are withholding proxy votes in
an effort to remove directors from company boards).
31 ' Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No, 6962, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126,
48,126 (Oct. 21, 1992).
" Id. at 48,120-27.
38 Id. at 48,1'27.
39 Id.
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shareholders for the stocks included in (i) the Standard and Poor's
500 Composite Stock Price Index ("S & P 500"); and (ii) any recog-
nized industry index (e.g., the Dow Jones Transportation Average) or
a group of peer companies selected by the registrant. 4° Following
substantial public comment and debate, 4 ' the SEC adopted the propos-
als with some changes made in the amount of information to be
disclosed. A number of the proposed tables were either revised or
dropped "to eliminate redundant information and to improve the
clarity of information presented."" Despite these changes, the increase
in the amount and type of information to be reported under the new
rules as compared with the material disclosed under the old regime
was substantial.
It is clear from these changes that the SEC has settled on a
disclosure-based approach to the compensation controversy. In the
SEC's view, the solution to overcompensation lies with an informed
and empowered shareholdership, informed as to exactly how much
the executives are earning and how that figure relates to performance,
and empowered to vote both on compensation resolutions and, if
thoroughly dissatisfied, on ultimate board replacement. SEC Chairman
Richard C. Breeden has summarized the Commission's theory behind
its actions by stating that:
The proposals would give the shareholders more information
and then make it reasonably possible for them to do some-
thing about that information . . . . The philosophy that un-
derlies the proposals is that the people in the best position,
if a company is deteriorating or stagnating, to do something
about. it are the people who own it For too long, the Wall
Street rule has been that if you don't like what's going on,
sell out. That has made it difficult and expensive for share-
holders. These proposals make sure the information is out in
the open and remove the restraints so shareholders can do
something."
This approach, although not without some visceral appeal (for
who can argue with a better-informed public), is basically ineffectual.
Indeed, in its very premise can be found the source of its primary
40 1d.
4L 57 Fed. Reg. at 48127. The SEC received more than 900 letters of comment concerning
the proposal. Id.
42 1d.
° Stephen Labaton, SEC Will Require Fuller Disclosure of Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1992, at Al, C22.
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weakness. The whole concept relies on the idea that an outraged and
invigorated shareholding public will provide the solution to the per-
ceived corporate malaise. Shareholder activism will result in more
accountable and productive management. The best way to create this
necessary activism is through the prodding effect of heightened disclo-
sure. Additionally, the more excessive a salary structure appears, the
more likely that full disclosure will embarrass management into cor-
recting the situation.
Although it is certainly true that as the owners of the enterprise,
shareholders have the power to engage effective and accountable man-
agers, it is equally clear that this ability does not always translate into
results. Indeed, it was the same shareholders who permitted the crea-
tion of that management capture that has led to the entire controversy.
Shareholder passivity created the problem, and it is unlikely that dis-
closure will provide the solution. This irksome passivity is not the result
of a lack of information, but, rather, a growth in the size of the typical
public corporate entity. The larger the corporation became, the more
likely its ownership took on an atomistic quality, with no one share-
holder or shareholding group exercising control." Moreover, as the
size of proportionate shareholding fell, individual shareholders, who
no longer held controlling or particularly significant amounts of stock,
lacked the incentive to take an active role in the corporation's affairs.
Management then filled the vacuum." InCreased disclosure will have
no effect on this situation. As Professor Bainbridge has observed:
Basic financial economics tells us that most shareholders pre-
fer to be passive investors. A rational shareholder will expend
the effort to make an informed decision only if the expected
benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and
complexity of SEC disclosure documents, the opportunity
costs are quite high and very apparent. In contrast, the bene-
fits aren't at all clear because most shareholders' holdings are
too small to have any significant effect on the vote's outcome.
For most shareholders, therefore, the investment of time and
effort necessary to make informed voting decisions remains
a game not worth playing. . . . What then will shareholders
do with the enhanced disclosure required by the commis-
sion's present proposals? They will do what they always do
44 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENRERO, CASES AND MATERIALS UN CORPORATIONS
142-43 (concise 6th ed. 1988).
45 Id. at 141.
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with corporate disclosure: ignore it and simply vote for man-
agement's director slate and management compensation pro-
posalS.46
What about the institutional investors whose growing ownership
presence in the largest public corporation presents, according to many
scholars, so much potential for effecting positive change in corporate
governance? Will increased disclosure motivate this group to pursue
more reasonable compensation practices? Probably not. First, for rea-
sons to be developed later in this section,47
 it is unlikely that institu-
tional investors, even if awakened from their current economic slum-
ber, will ever achieve the substantial control position in a corporation
necessary to direct the affairs of the business. Second, it is unclear that
the compensation disclosure now mandated by the SEC will inform
institutional investors (or individual investors, for that matter) of any-
thing that they do not already know. As a result of the heightened
media attention to the issue, much information on compensation
programs in a dizzying variety of corporations (based on past disclo-
sure requirements) has flooded the market-place. Various popular
financial publications feature annual performance profiles of numer-
ous public companies detailing compensation practices and how they
relate to overall performance. 48
 There is no shortage of information
available to the individual investor on corporate compensation. More-
over, the performance comparisons the SEC has now required report-
ing companies to make are well within the analytical capabilities of
even the most inexperienced financial analyst and may be available to
all investors through periodic brokerage house reports. Indeed, the
SEC's new disclosure regime will only serve to create more fodder for
potential Rule 10b-5 mis-disclosure actions. 49 The end result may be an
48 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Pay: Who Listens?, LEGAL TIIIES, Aug. 10, 1992, at 23.
See also Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 Bus. LAW. 461, 525 (1992)
(observing that shareholders are not effective monitors or a company's board of directors and
that prominent features of corporate law actually make it difficult for shareholders to hold the
board and managers legally responsible).
47 See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., The Boss's Pay, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 22, 1992, at R9; Executive Compensation Scoreboard,
Bus. Wit., May 4, 1992, at 149; What 800 Companies Paid Their Bosses, FORBES, May 25, 1992, at
182.
49 See Bainbridge, supra note 46, at '22 (commenting that disclosure rules only benefit
plaintiffs' lawyers who will bring lawsuits and defense lawyers who will defend them). To avoid
this potential liability, companies have started to hire a variety of different advisors, including law
firms, compensation consultants, public relations firms, accountants, investment banks, computer
software makers, and publishers of electronic data. Thus, company shareholders must pay for
increased disclosure in the form of fees the company pays to these advisors. Joann S. Lublin &
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increase in official information available, but with little corresponding
benefit. 5° Increased required disclosure will do little to arrest the tra-
ditional cause of shareholder passivity and will have an insignificant
impact on overcompensation.
B. Increased Taxation
The second major response to the compensation controversy has
come from the legislature. In early August, 1993, the Congress, upon
the recommendation of the President, enacted legislation that placed
a one million dollar limit on the deductibility of executive compensa-
tion. Under a provision contained within the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993, corporations are no longer able to deduct, as a business
expense, compensation payments to executives that exceed one mil-
lion dollars per annum that are not performance-based. 5 ' Additionally,
a special surtax has been imposed on incomes in excess of two hundred
fifty thousand dollars per year." The theory seems to be that by remov-
ing the deductibility of high salaries, and increasing the taxes due by
the recipients of sizeable compensation, corporations and the individ-
ual recipients will find it too costly to negotiate excessive compensation
packages. The benefits of high compensation to the recipient will be
taxed out of existence and the corporation itself will find it twice as
expensive to pay such large salaries. Moreover, by setting the taxation
tripwire at one million dollars, Congress seems to have concluded that
salaries over this level are per se excessive.
Although this approach will certainly "solve" the compensation
problem and simultaneously produce heightened revenues for a tax-
Julie A. Lopez, Executive-Pay Disclosure Rules Pay OfjPor Advisors, WALL Si'. J., Jan. 15, 1993, at
B1
50 Indeed, the new disclosure requirements may even have the deleterious effect of deluging
the investor in "data-overkill." Joann Lublin, Executives Grumble About SEC Plan to Require More
Pay Data, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1992, at B1. The new disclosure requirements, however, appear
to have increased institutional investor scrutiny of the compensation practices of at least one
company. The Wisconsin public pension fund is seeking to remove the outside directors of
Paramount Communications who approved the company's executive compensation plan. The
fund is basing its action on charts, required by the SEC, which show that, although Paramount's
stock has underperformed both the Standard & Poors 500 stock index as well as peer group
stocks, Paramount executives continued to receive bonuses. Susan Pulliam, Paramount Is Targeted
by Pension Fund Due to Weak Stock Price, Executive Pay, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 4, 1993, at A4.
51 Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
See supra note 10 and accompanying text for. a discussion of the new limitations placed upon
corporate deductions for executive compensation.
52 Omnibus Revenue Reconciliation Bill of 1993, H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
See supra note 11 and accompanying text for an examination of the surtax placed on individual
incomes in excess of two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
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starved treasury, it will have no favorable impact on corporate health
in general. This response is akin to removing a splinter by amputating
the limb. The splinter is gone, but at enormous cost. Similarly, this
tax-based "cure" may result in more harm to the patient than the initial
problem.
First, there is nothing inherently wrong with a salary over one
million dollars. An executive who produces substantial increases in
corporate profitability that results in large profits for the shareholders,
may be worth paying more to retain in the competitive labor market
place. 5a The salary is only problematic when it has not been fairly
bargained for. Second, a salary not only provides compensation for an
individual's efforts, but also acts as an incentive for future activity.
Companies compensate both to reward past activities and to encourage
greater productivity in the future. The idea emanates from the classic
carrot-stick parable. It is not the stick that compels productive labor,
but the carrot as incentive. The larger the carrot, the greater incentive
to increase productivity?' While a large salary may certainly be viewed
as a wasteful expenditure of corporate assets if one assumes that wages
were simply created to compensate solely for work produced, from a
different perspective, heavy compensation may be beneficial to the
corporate enterprise as a powerful incentive for heightened manage-
ment creativity and effort. The larger the proffered salary, the greater
effort potentially to be expended. To limit arbitrarily the amount of
compensation will effectively eliminate any incentive for the kind of
executive productivity necessary to keep our large corporations com-
petitive.
The term compensation itself is a bit of a misnomer, for compen-
sation is not merely a reward for past services, but also acts as an
incentive for future efforts. As pointed out earlier, a large salary is not
in and of itself pernicious; it is only when it has not been bargained
for and is a simple toll paid to the ineffective that it becomes trouble-
some. 55
 To solve the perceived problem of overcompensation by sum-
marily taxing out of existence salaries over one million dollars per year
53 5f?  CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 159-73 (arguing that high-paid CEOs of Reebok, Walt
Disney, and H.J. Heinz are properly compensated due to the risk they take and the returns they
generate for their shareholders),
54 See LLOYD G. REYNOLDS ET AL., LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 183-84 (1986).
See also Burchman, supra note 25, at 189-211 (discussing ways to create proper incentives through
executive compensation). This "carrot" theory of compensation is evidently in operation as IBM
searches for a new CEO. Despite IBM's well-publicized problems, it has had little difficulty finding
accomplished candidates for the lucrative position. Michael W. Miller, IBM's Search for New Leader
Appears Ahead of Schedule, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,1993, at B1.
55 See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
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would stifle the crucial incentives created by the prospect of high, and
perhaps seemingly excessive, salary levels.
C. Judicial Activism
While some have sought to curtail compensation through height-
ened disclosure or tax-based legislative limits, one group of commen-
tators has focused on a judicially-based approach." They maintain that
active judicial review of executive compensation structures may serve
to limit executive salaries. Professor Vagts has argued that while judicial
evaluations of "the excessiveness of compensation are not easy to make,
they are not impossible. . . . [C] ourts can and should carefully scruti-
nize compensation that is substantially out of line and prune off the
abnormal amount when not justified by special risks run by the execu-
tive recipients or special contributions made by them."57 This approach
to the compensation issue is not without some appeal but it may prove
to be as ineffective today as it was when the problem first emerged in
the mid-1930s.
Board compensation decisions are generally protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule. 58 Provided that there has been an informed deci-
5r See Barris, supra note 2, at 86-88; Vagts, supra note 4, at 252-61. Both authors point out
the willingness of several courts to grapple with the overcompensation issue by applying compara-
tive data in judging the appropriateness of compensation in close corporation, tax and partner-
ship cases. Although the authors note that there are salient differences between public corpora-
tions and close corporations, and between tax cases and derivative actions, they each conclude
that courts should be willing to apply the same type of analysis in the context of public corporation
overcompensation cases. Barris, supra note 2, at 86-88; Vagts, supra note 4, at 252-61. See also
Bogus, supra note 12, at 79-83.
57 Vagts, supra note 4, at 276. See also Barris, supra note 2, at 87. But see Geoffrey S. Rehnert,
Comment, The Executive Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1147,1154 n.38 (1985) (observing that courts have not applied reasoning employed
in close corporation and tax cases to public corporation cases).
t8 Compensation decisions are in essence "self dealing" transactions because they nay be
voted on by those inside directors who have an obvious stake in the decision and theoretically
should be reviewed under the rules governing self-interested transactions, which require that
such transactions must (1) be fully disclosed to the corporate decision-makers and (2) be fair to
the corporation in order to pass muster. Because "compensation differs from other self-interested
transactions," these rules are applied sotnewhat differently. Section 5,03 of' the LALI'sJ Principles
of Corporate Governance, following the case law, therefore breaks off compensation transactions
for separate treatment by adopting the rule that if full disclosure has been made, and the
compensation has been approved by disinterested directors, it will be reviewed only under a
business judgment standard. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Self-Interested Transactions in Corporate Law,
13 j. CORP. L. 997, 1006 (1988). Therefore, provided that an executive who is also a director does
not vote on his compensation arrangement, the disinterested directors' decision to approve that
arrangement will be protected by the business judgment rule. See Barris, supra note 2, at 81-83.
In Aronson v, Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1983), the Delaware Supreme Court described the
business judgment rule as:
[A] presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
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sion-making process and no self-dealing, a board's compensation
award will be judicially unassailable, with one exception. Where com-
pensation to an executive simply bears no relation to the services that
individual has rendered, it will be considered a waste of corporate
assets and thus actionable. 59
 This standard was initially promulgated by
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interest ... of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion,
that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challeng-
ing the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.
Id. at 812 (citations omitted). The American Law Institute—in its Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance has defined the rule in the following manner:
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith fulfills his
duty under this Section if
(1) he is not interested . . in the subject of his business judgment;
(2) he is informed with respect to the subject of his business judgment to the
extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
(3) he rationally believes that his business judgment is in the best interest of the
corporation.
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SUpra note 16, § 4.01. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). See also Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963); Wall & Beaver
Street Corp. v. Munson Line, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 109 (a Md. 1944); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining
Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (F.D. Ky, 1939), aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1942); Haber v. Bell, 465 A.2d
353 (Del. Ch. 1983).
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Beard v. Elster, explained the rationale behind the appli-
cation of the business judgment rule to compensation decisions:
We have before us a [stock option] plan which, in the judgment of a disinterested
Board, is adequately designed to further the corporate purpose of securing the
retention of key employees' services. It is theoretically possible, we suppose, that
some businessmen could be found who would hold the opinion that options
exercisable at once were improvidently granted, but, on the other hand, there are
businessmen who would hold a favorable view, as this board of independent busi-
nessmen in fact did. At most, therefore, we find ourselves in the twilight zone where
reasonable businessmen, fully informed, might differ. We think, therefore, we are
precluded from substituting our uninformed opinion for that of experienced busi-
ness managers of a corporation who have no personal interest in the outcome, and,
whose sole interest is the furtherance of the corporate enterprise.
160 .A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960), affd sub nom. Elster v. American Airlines, 167 A.2d 231 (1961).
Section 5.03 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance provides in part that a court may
not invalidate a compensation arrangement if it is "authorized in advance or ratified by disinter-
ested directors . . . in a manner that satisfies the standards of the business judgment rule."
PRINCIPI.ES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 16, § 5.03(a) (2). Where directors have a
personal interest in the fixing of executive compensation, the business judgment rule does not
apply and the directors must prove that the transactions were fair to the corporation. Cohen v.
Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, 90 A.2d
652 (Del. 1952), reh'g denied, 90 A.2d 652 (1952); Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d
660 (Del. 1952)).
59
 Even disinterested directors and shareholders cannot ratify waste. Rogers v, Hill, 289 U.S.
582, 591-92 (1933) ("If a bonus payment has no relation to the value of services for which it is
given, it is in reality a gift in part, and the majority stockholders have no power to give away
corporate property against the protest of the minority."). Courts usually define "waste" in terms
of the adequacy of consideration the corporation receives from the employee in return for the
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the Supreme Court in 1933 in Rogers v. Hi11, 60 which remains the
seminal compensation case. 6' Following disclosures made in the 1930s
of substantial compensation paid to executives immediately prior to
and during the Great Depression, a number of shareholder actions
were brought challenging these compensation practices. 62 The Rogers
decision determined the approach for judicial review of these claims.
While the "waste" standard articulated by the Rogers Court was
seemingly simple to comprehend, problems arose in its actual applica-
tion. The difficulty was, of course, in determining when exactly com-
pensation was unrelated to services rendered. The oft-cited language
of a New York State Supreme Court Judge in the legendary Heller v.
Boylan''' decision highlights the difficulty of determining what consti-
tuted actionable waste:
Assuming arguendo, that the compensation should be re-
vised, what yardstick is to be employed? Who or what is to
supply the measuring-rod? The conscience of equity? Equity
is but another name of human being temporarily judicially
robed. He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so
arrogant as to hold that it knows more about managing this
compensation paid by the corporation. See, e.g., Pugostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 625 (Del. 1984)
(holding that stock option plans must contain conditions or surrounding circumstances must be
such that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the contemplated benefit from the
grant of options); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962) (ruling that the court's
examination is limited to discovering whether what the corporation has received from the
employee is so inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would
deem it worth what the corporation paid). Courts have held that boards have nut wasted
corporate assets when the boards canceled existing stock option plans and reissued new options
to executives at a lower exercise price when the company's stock price declined. See Cohen, 596
F.2c1 at 741-43.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in International Ins. Co. v. Johns,
ruled that in determining whether a corporation receives "adequate" consideration for payments
to an executive, a court must inquire into whether the compensation an executive receives bears
a "reasonable relationship" to the services rendered. 874 F.2d 1447 (1989) (citations omitted),
The court further stated that to find a reasonable relationship, a court must answer three
questions. First, did the corporation benefit from the services rendered? If the corporation
received no benefits in exchange for the payments, the compensation plan is waste. Second, was
the compensation so disproportionate to the benefits received that a reasonable person would
think that the corporation received no quid pro quo? If no quid pro quo resulted, the payments
would constitute corporate gifts. Finally, did the services rendered trigger the payments? If some
other occurrence triggered the payments, the plan is invalid because it cannot assure perform-
ance, Id. at 1461-62 (citations omitted).
6°289 U.S. 582 (1933).
61 Barris, ;supra note 2, at 84.
62 Vagt.s, supra note 4, at 252-53.
°Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941), gild mem., 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div.
1941), reh'g denied, 32 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1942).
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corporation than its stockholders?
Yes, the Court possesses the power to prune these payments,
but openness forces the confession that the pruning would
be synthetic and artificial rather than analytic or scientific.
Whether or not it would be fair and just, is highly dubious.
Yet, merely because the problem is perplexing is no reason
for eschewing it. It is not timidity, however, which perturbs
me. It is finding a rational or just gauge for revising these
figures were I inclined to do so. No blueprints are furnished.
The elements to be weighed are incalculable; the imponder-
ables, manifold. To act out of whimsy or caprice or arbitrari-
ness would be more than inexact—it would be the precise
antithesis of justice; it would be a farce.
If comparisons are to be made, with whose compensation
are they to be made—executives? Those connected with the
motion picture industry? Radio artists? Justices of the Su-
preme Court of the United States? The President of the
United States? Courts are ill-equipped to solve or even to
grapple with these entangled economic problems. Indeed,
their solution is not within the juridical province. 64
For these reasons, courts have been highly reluctant to involve
themselves in compensation disputes. A compensation decision is not
really capable of mechanistic review. It is essentially a business judg-
ment and the same rationale that mandated the creation of the busi-
ness judgment rule lies behind judicial reluctance to characterize cer-
tain payments as "waste." A court is hardly in a better position than an
informed, impartial board to determine an executive's worth. 6' Fur-
thermore, the liability that would result from such judicial second-
guessing would seriously compromise a board's effectiveness and its
ability to recruit prospective members. Thus, since the Heller ruling,
there have been few reported cases dealing with the compensation
levels of executives of large publicly-traded corporations. In those
cases, the courts have reached similar results, "either appl[ying] the
business judgment rule and endors[ing] the compensation practice,
or simply throw[ing] in the towel and refus[ing] to deal with the
problem. "66
Despite judicial reluctance to decide compensation questions in-
64 29 N.Y.S.2d at 679-80.
65 Barris, supra note 2, at 82. See also Vagts, supra note 4, at 254-55.
66
 Barris, supra note 2, at 82. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. See also Barris,
supra note 2, at 86-88; Vagts, supra note 4, at 255-57.
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volving large, public corporations, the same reticence is not evident in
numerous cases regarding compensation disputes in smaller close cor-
porations. Courts regularly pass on salary fairness, or lack thereof, in
this area.° In addition, in the tax arena, both tax court and U.S. District
Court judges frequently review executive compensation packages to
determine the appropriateness of specific corporate deductions for
"reasonable" compensation expenditures under § 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code." Commentators argue that if the courts have no prob-
lem determining the reasonableness of compensation in the close
corporation and tax settings, they should extend the same "judicial
aggressiveness" to the large corporation compensation cases."`'
This call for judicial activism, in the face of escalating compensa-
tion packages, will remain as unheeded by the courts in the future as
it was when initially issued by Professor Vagts more than ten years ago.
Although courts have indeed manifested a willingness to review com-
pensation in certain limited contexts, Professor Vagts' call to action
underestimates the critical differences between compensation disputes
in the close corporation or tax cases and those involving large corpo-
rations. The close corporation compensation cases are not disputes
about compensation at all. Rather, they are grounded in the attempted
oppression of minority shareholders by a controlling shareholder or
group of shareholders. 7" In actuality, these cases involve attempts by
See, e.g., Roged, Inc. v. l'aglec, 372 A.2d 1059 (Md. 1977); Galler v. Galler, 316 N.E.2d 114
(111, 1974), aff'd, 336 N.E.2d 886 (1975); Baker v. Cohn, 42 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1942), modified
and aff'd, 40 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1943), aff'd as modified, 54 N.E.2d 689 (1944). See also Barris, supra
note 2, at 87; Vagts, supra note 4, at 256.
68 The Internal Revenue Code states generally that a trade or business deduction shall he
allowed for all ordinary and necessary expenses, a provision which includes a "reasonable"
allowance for salaries and compensation for services actually rendered. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1) (1988).
Factors used by the courts include: the employee's qualifications; the nature, extent and scope
of the employee's work; the size and complexity of the business; a comparison of salaries paid
with the gross income and the net income; the prevailing general economic conditions; compari-
son of salaries with distributions to stockholders; the prevailing rates of compensation for com-
parable position in comparable concerns; the salary policy of the taxpayer as to all employees;
and, in the case of small corporations with a limited number of officers, the amount of compen-
sation paid to the particular employee in recent years. Mayson Mfg. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 115, 119
(6th Cir. 1949). See generally WILLIAM E. PAINTER, CORPORATE AND TAX ASPECTS OF CLOSELY
HELD CORPORATIONS 215-20 (2d ed. 1981); David E. Hoffman, Heeding Significant Factors Im-
proves the Odds for Reasonable Compensation, 50 J. Tax'N 155 (1979).
69 Barris, supra note 2, at 87; Vagts, supra note 4, at 276, See also Charles M. Yablon,
Overcompensating: The Corporate Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1896-1906
(1992) (reviewing GRAVY S. CRYSTAL., IN SEARCH OF EXCESS (1991)) (suggesting that easing the
legal standard from "waste" to "reasonable in relation to the corporate benefits expected" will
create the possibility of litigation with attendant uncertainty which will result in incentive for
restraint by CEOs seeking substantially above-average compensation).
All of the close corporation cases Professor Vagts cites to support his proposition that courts
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the controlling shareholders to steer large portions of the corporate
profits selfward rather than sharing the fruits of corporate success
proportionately with their fellow equity-holders. Instead of dividing the
profits evenly through dividends, the controlling individuals enrich
only themselves through large compensation packages, leaving fellow
shareholders out in the cold, deprived of the benefits of equity owner-
ship. 7 '
Whether effected through simple greed or as part of some nefari-
ous "freeze-out" scheme,72
 this manifestly unfair sharing is the type of
self-dealing that courts, from an equity standpoint, are eager to rem-
edy. It is not the size of the compensation that provokes a judicial
response, but the attempt to divert profits from the minority holders.
These shareholders really have no other remedy besides judicial inter-
vention. Because of their minority status, they cannot win a board or
shareholder vote on the practice, nor is there any market for their
shares. The only potential purchaser is the oppressing majority. In such
circumstances, it is a relatively appealing task for a court to intervene
and find the compensation unjustified, either forcing a proper sharing
of corporate profits with the minority, or a majority buy-out of their
shares at an acceptable price. This explains judicial willingness to
engage in compensation review in this area. Such judicial involvement
is not really about compensation; rather, it involves clear and remedi-
can determine reasonable compensation involved some kind of self-dealing or had faith conduct.
Vagts, supra note 4, at 256 nn.1 14-15 (citing Ruetz. v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Mo. CL App.
1970) (defendant, president of company, raised his own salary; suit brought by defendant's
ex-wife who owned hall' of the company's stock); Fendelman v. Fenco Handbag Co., 482 S.W.2d
461 (Mo. 1972) (majority shareholder directors forced minority shareholder director who
founded company out of office and paid no dividends to non-director shareholders; founder
returned to former job °laming linings for purses); Goldman v. Jameson, 275 So. 2d 108 (Ala.
1973) (directors owning 80% of company stock removed minority shareholder from board and
did not pay dividends); Binz v. St, Louis Hide & Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. CL App. 1964)
(after minority shareholder/director sold stock to son, other directors brought in additional
directors in violation of stock agreement and raised their salaries)).
In one study, courts found compensation to be excessive in 23 out of 67 close corporation
overcompensation cases. Of these 23 cases, all but one involved self-help or self-dealing on the
part of the defendant executive. 2 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, St/pFa note 6, at 865-67.
Most courts, before they will substitute their judgment for that of the directors, seem to
require that unreasonable compensation be coupled with a clear showing of dishonest, oppressive
or improvident corporate management that they can label 'fraud," "bad faith," "breach of
fiduciary duty," 'waste," or "spoliation."
1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLD-
ERS § 3.08, at 59-60 (2d ed. 1991).
71
 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1986); Bessette v. Bessette, 434 N.E.2d
206 (Mass. 1982); Shelstad v. Cook, 253 N.W.2d 517 (Wis. 1977).
72 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-15 (Mass, 1975) (describing
various freeze-out techniques). See generally O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 70, § 3.07.
September 1993)	 EXECUTIVE OVERCOMPENSATION	 965
able self-dealing. Without the protection of the courts, few investors
would be willing to accept minority status in a small corporation, and
such enterprises would be deprived of necessary investment capital.
This is not the case in the large public corporation setting where
excessive executive compensation deprives shareholders of a relatively
small portion of profits and is effected by a group without the kind of
absolute control possible in the close corporation arena. In small
businesses, it is not uncommon for a control group to possess over 50%
of the corporation's stock and effectively block any kind of minority
response to unwelcome actions." In the large public corporation,
management controls a relatively small amount of stock and can always
be outvoted by an outraged shareholdership. This is obviously not an
easy task but it is not a numerical impossibility, as is often the case in
the close corporation setting. Thus, judicial involvement seems less
necessary, as the problem appears less drastic and other remedies are
available. Concerns about judicial competence to review compensation
reemerge and stifle intervention. 74
Judicial activism in the taxation cases is also easily distinguished
from the ordinary compensation dispute. The general object of any
kind of tax litigation is not the punishment of some overreaching
executive, but the production of additional revenue for a tax-starved
federal treasury." The objective is revenue generation and any judicial
73 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511 (defining a close corporation as a corporation typified by
"(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; and (3)
substantial majority stockholder participation in management"). Holders of a majority of a
company's stock have the ability to elect and control a majority of the company's directors and
thus have the power to employ a variety of techniques to deprive minority shareholders of the
value of their interests in the company. Some examples of these techniques include a refusal to
declare dividends, payment of exorbitant salaries to majority shareholder officers, refimil to
employ minority shareholders, and sale of corporate assets to majority shareholders at inadequate
prices, O'NEAL & TtiomPsoN, supra note 70, § 3.02.
74
	
to the disparity in size of earnings between a small close corporation and a large public
corporation, it is usually easier for a court to determine whether an executive's salary is excessive
in the close corporation. For example, a $1 million salary for an executive in a Fortune 500
company is insignificant in relation to the company's bottom line, whereas in a small close
corporation, the same salary could constitute a significant percentage of the company's earnings
for a given year and thus substantially reduce dividend payments to the company's shareholders.
See Vagts, supra note 4, at 255-56.
" The executive compensation cases in this area generally deal with close corporations in
which company executives arc also controlling shareholders. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue
Code is designed to prevent these owner-managers from distributing sums in the guise of salaries
(which are deductible by the corporation) that are actually non-deductible dividends and [fills
subject to corporate-level taxation. Id. at 257. Thus, in this area, courts do not focus solely on time
reasonableness of an executive's compensation. They arc equally, if not more, concerned with a
company's dividend policy. See, e.g., McCandless 'file Serv. v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct.
Cl. 1970) (finding compensation reasonable, yet disallowing deduction because the corporation
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concern about second-guessing a board is secondary to the process.
With this in mind, courts review compensation in this arena not with
the objective of limiting unreasonable salaries, but to determine the
legitimacy of income deductions that reduce tax revenues. 76 The busi-
ness judgment concerns that accompany judicial review of ordinary
compensation actions are simply not present in this area and thus do
not create the same judicial reluctance to become involved.
The problem of judicial involvement in large corporation com-
pensation disputes, like that raised Heller," is as valid today as it was
fifty years ago. Courts neither feel comfortable nor particularly well-
qualified to substitute their business judgment for that of an informed
board of directors. Nothing has changed in the past five decades to
enable courts to determine with any better precision what part of a
salary has been earned and what part constitutes "waste." The Judici-
ary's discomfort and consequent reticence remain and will continue.
There simply is no mechanistic procedure available to compute with
precision an executive's worth and any judicial resolution of the matter
involves a judgment call of the type courts have typically avoided.
Unless a plaintiff can introduce some kind of evidence of fraudulent
or collusive behavior on the part of a board in its compensation
decision-making process, misconduct which would provide for easy
judicial resolution, it is highly unlikely that the courts will abandon
their traditional passivity in compensation cases. Judicial activism is
simply not a realistic solution to the overcompensation dilemma.
D. Institutional Shareholder Activism
Another proffered solution to the compensation problem involves
institutional shareholder activism. It is argued that institutional inves-
did not pay dividends the previous live years). See also Geoffrey S. Rehnert, The Executive
Compensation Contract: Creating Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs, 37 STAN. L. REV, 1147, 1155
n.38 (1985).
"The legal standard in the tax cases is different from the standard in shareholder suits.
While shareholders must show that compensation amounts to "waste," the test in the tax cases is
merely one of "reasonableness." See supra notes 59 and 68.
Professor Vagis observes that very few tax cases involve public corporations. Vag ts, supra note
4, at 258. This fact is not surprising given that, in most public corporations, compensation is
approved by a majority of disinterested directors and has no relation to the company's dividend
policy. Ha public company does not pay dividends, it usually reinvests the sums into the company
for new capital or debt service. But see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. United States, 149 F. Supp.
889, 896-97 (CL Cl. 1957) (finding that distributions of profits to employees of a public corpo-
ration in proportion to the employees' stockholdings constituted a dividend distribution and not
compensation).
77 Heller s Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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tors, who increasingly constitute the largest shareholders in many of
the largest public corporations, 78 possess tremendous potential to ef-
fect positive change in the operation of these businesses by becoming
more active "monitors" of corporate management. The size and finan-
cial sophistication of institutional investors make them uniquely posi-
tioned to take the lead in promoting corporate productivity. Increased
institutional investor activism will result in more effective shareholder
oversight of both boards and managers and may prove a solution to
corporate inefficiency by stimulating more productive and responsive
management. Indeed, much scholarly attention has been devoted to
the "promise of institutional investor voice." 79
The positive potential of active monitoring may also carry over to
the compensation area. Professor Black has suggested that despite
"systemic shortfalls in corporate performance . . . institutional over-
sight, either directly or through stronger boards of directors, could
correct these shortfalls. . . . Institutional investors could add value by
. establishing a more arm's-length process for setting CEO pay." 88 As
a corporation's largest shareholders, institutions may have the clout to
force a board to bargain impartially and effectively with senior man-
agement to produce reasoned compensation arrangements. Failure to
so act could result in a board's ultimate replacement by a coalition of
shareholders spearheaded by the agitated institutional investors. The
prospect, or even the actual or perceived threat, of such action would
"By the end of 1990, institutions owned 53% of the equity in U.S. companies. In addition,
institutions have begun to concentrate their assets in specific companies. Jayne W. Barnard,
Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135, 1190 (1991)
(observing that the top twenty pension funds plus the ten largest U.S. money managers hold
more than 16% ot the shares in the 10 largest. U.S. corporations) (citing William Taylor, Can Big
Owners Make a Big Difference?, HARV. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70); Black, Agents, supra note
17, at 827. See also Carolyn K. Brancato, The. Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital
Markets, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIF.S OF THE 21s'r CENTURY
3-33 (Arnold W. Satnetz & James L. Bicksler eds., 1991); Barris, supra note 2, at 89.
"Black, Agents, supra note 17. See also MONKS & MINOW, supra note 2; Barnard, supra note
78; Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 13; Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and
Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BRooK. L. REV. 1 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control: The. Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 CoLum. L. REV. 1277
(1991); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. Micut. J.L. REF. 117
(1988); George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,
1989 WIS. L. RF.V. 881 (1989); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17; Louis Lowenstein, Why
Managements Should (And Should Not) Have Respect for Their Shareholders, 17 J. CORP. L. 1 (1991);
Thomas C. Paefgen, Institutional Investors Ante Torras: A Comparative Analysis of an Emergent
Force in Corporate America and Germany, 26 Lim. 327 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic
and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991); Robert
D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of Sand: The Weak Premises Underlying the Current Push for Proxy Rule
Changes, 1'7 J. CORP. L. 163 (1991).
S0 Black, Empirical Evidence, supra note 13, at 899, 915-17.
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be strong enough to convince otherwise passive directors to act more
effectively.
To encourage this seemingly positive form of monitoring, a num-
ber of commentators have proposed various reforms in the legal rules
regulating institutional conduct in order to give institutional investors
more freedom and incentive to engage in active oversight of corporate
activities. 8 ' In addition, they have formulated numerous techniques for
institutional investors to use in their attempts to exercise corporate
contro1. 82
 These proposals include: amending various SEC regulations
to permit more communication and coordination between institu-
tions;88
 altering regulations governing institutional investment strategy
to restrict portfolio diversification to discourage investor "exit" and
encourage investor "voice;"84
 creating activist shareholders' advisory
committees to make management more. aware of institutional con-
cerns;" placing representatives of the institutional investors on the
corporate boards themselves; 86
 or even creating a cadre of professional
directors who would serve on corporate boards to demand effective
management."
St See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990)
(describing the complex web of legal rules and cultural factors that prevent institutional share-
holders from becoming more active monitors); Coffee, supra note 79 (suggesting that an incen-
tive for institutional monitoring be created by restricting portfolio diversification, requiring fund
managers to price investment and monitoring services separately, and authorizing incentive
compensation for fund managers); Conard, supra note 79, at 176-78 (calling for, among other
things, greater access to company proxy statements and the removal of the threat of "controlling
person" liability); Dent, supra note 79, at 907 (proposing that a committee of a firm's 10 or 20
largest shareholders be given authority to use corporate funds to solicit proxies). Cf. Rosenbaum,
supra note 79 (contending that changes in the proxy rules are unnecessary). See also Mark J. Roe,
A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLum. L. REV. 10 (1991) (observing that
U.S. financial institutions cannot reach their full potential as monitors due to a variety of legal
prohibitions designed to prevent them from gaining too much power).
82
 See Black, Agents, supra note 17, at 830-49, for a discussion of the variety of methods
institutional investors could employ to affect corporate performance.
85
 See Bernard S. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. CORP. L.
49 (1991) thereinafter Black, Disclosure]; Conard, supra note 79, at 161-62, 177-78; Dent, supra
note 79, at 907-23.
84 Coffee, supra note 79, at 1351-66.
85
 Participation in a "shareholders' advisory committee" is the most commonly proposed role
for the institutional investor. In general, these committees would be composed of representatives
of a company's largest shareholders and would be appointed by the board of directors for
one-year terms. The committee would advise the board on matters of concern to the company's
shareholders and submit proposals from time to time. See Barnard, supra note 79; Rock, supra
note 79, at 49. Professor Barnard argues that shareholders' advisory committees will be ineffective
monitors of corporate performance and suggests that institutions should place representatives
on the board itself, rather than on some "shadow committee," Barnard, supra note 79, at 1168-73.
86 See LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN AND THE
ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 209-10 (1988); Barnard, supra note 79, at 1168-73; Dent, supra note
79, at 907.
"Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 883-92.
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It is unquestionable that institutional investors have begun to
exercise more power over corporate affairs than they did even a few
years ago. In a number of large corporations, they have been active
agitators for change in corporate policy and personnel. Most recently,
a number of the large institutions have played a major role in forcing
changes in management and policy at such prominent corporations as
IBM, Sears Roebuck, American Express, and even General Motors."
Despite this activity, it is unclear whether these groups will either be
able, or even desire to be a primary force in effecting change in
executive compensation practices." There are a number of reasons
why sole reliance on institutions to resolve the compensation contro-
versy would be a mistake.
The first set of problems with institutional action is general in
nature. There are several fundamental reasons why institutional inves-
tors, as currently constituted, may never be able to monitor corporate
activities in the manner envisioned by their supporters. The first con-
cern has to do with investment strategy. Professor Coffee has argued
that there is an inherent preference among many institutions to struc-
ture their investment portfolios in such a manner as to provide maxi-
mum liquidity. Investments are arranged by type and size to provide
for quick and easy disposition in the event that conditions warrant.
Thus, investments that are not readily saleable are avoided. Such li-
quidity, the ability to easily exit an investment, effectively eliminates
88 As its financial outlook has deteriorated, 113M has faced increased shareholder agitation
from groups such as the United Shareholders Association (USA). USA plans to press at. IBM's
annual meeting for the passage of four proxy proposals which deal with management perform-
ance, oversight, and compensation. Catherine Arnst Joseph Weber, IBM After Akers, Bus. Wit.,
Feb, 8, 1993, at 22, Sears Roebuck's Edward Brennan relinquished several leadership roles and
the company agreed to divest itself of certain business lines in the face of growing shareholder
threats. Stewart, supra note 21, at 35. Despite the fact that American Express Chairman .James C.
Robinson III initially persuaded his board to keep him in power in the face of disappointing
results, institutional shareholder agitation eventually led to his resignation. J. P. Morgan, joined
by Alliance Capital and Putnam Management, was highly influential in forcing Rubinson's
removal. Leslie Wayne, Shareholders Exercise New Power with Nation's Biggest Companies, N.Y.
TumEs, Feb. 1, 1993, at Al. It was institutional shareholder pressure that was instrumental in
convincing the board of General Motors to demand the resignation of its chief executive, Robert
C. Stempel. Id. See Stewart, supra note 21, for a list of companies that have responded to investor
pressure by changing leadership. See also Black, Agents, supra note 17, at 828-29.
In addition, investors such as the Council of Institutional Investors, USA, and several state
employee pension funds have all gained the attention of corporate management by creating
publicized "hit lists" of poorly-performing corporations. Kevin G. Salwen, Institutions Are Poised
to Increase Clout in Boardroom, WALL. ST . J., Sept. 21, 1992, at Bl. A prime example is ITT Corp.
which held several meetings with shareholders and agreed to demands that certain management
policies be changed, in order to be removed from USA's "hit list." Salwen & Lublin, supra note
13.
89 See infra note 100.
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any incentive to exercise a meaningful voice in corporate affairs. The
institutions
have considerable reason to remain 'rationally apathetic'
about corporate governance and little reason to become ac-
tive participants. Why? [A] tradeoff exists and must be recog-
nized between liquidity and control. Investors that want li-
quidity may hesitate to accept control .... [A] preference
for liquidity chills the willingness of institutional investors to
participate in the control of major corporations . . 9°
Coffee suggests several structural reforms to lessen the bias towards
"exit" and encourage the exercise of "voice"—such as "a restricted
diversification strategy which would discourage institutional inves-
tors from diversifying beyond the limits of their monitoring capac-
ity."91
 Unless such reforms are implemented, however, the contin-
ued predilection towards liquidity lessens the incentive to monitor,
which suggests a continuing passivity among the institutions.
The second concern involves size and communication. Although
institutional holdings are substantial, particularly in dollar terms, each
institution's ownership interest in the various corporations in which it
invests is likely to be proportionately quite smal1. 92
 This reflects a
preference for liquidity and portfolio diversification as well as legal
restraints °s
 As a result, even if a company's stock is held primarily by
institutions, these holders, individually, control very little of that com-
pany's overall equity. To exercise "control," therefore, a number of
institutions would have to agree to form a coalition. This may be
problematic. First, each institution may have varying goals regarding
its investment in a particular company and its own general investment
strategy. No two institutions are precisely alike insofar as participant
composition and investment goals are concerned." Consequently, each
• 9 Coffee, supra note 79, at 1281.
91 Id. at 1338.
92
 For example, even the nation's largest state employee pension fund, Calpers (California
Public Employees' Retirement System), only owns .6% of Westinghouse's outstanding shares.
Mieher, supra note 32, at A3, A6. Indeed, despite its stock portfolio totalling $25 billion, Calpers
has limited its holdings to just under a 1% ownership interest in more than 1,000 large U.S.
corporations. George Anders, Restless Natives: While Head of Calpers Lectures Other Firms, His Own
Board Frets, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1993, at Al, A9.
93 See Coffee, supra note 79. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
94 See Brancato, supra note 78, at 7-13 ("Institutional investors are not a 'monolithic' group
and have widely divergent investment and risk objectives, as well as varying attitudes on their
appropriate role in corporate governance."). One commentator argues that public pension funds,
which have the greatest power to influence management, are not well-equipped to do so effec-
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would likely respond to varying control issues with differing levels of
concern. Where interests diverge, coalitions and consequent power
may disappear. Second, as some commentators have observed, to act
as a group, the varying shareholding institutions must be able to
communicate with one another freely. Under present SEC regulations,
including the proxy rules, however, such communication may be re-
stricted." Although changes have been suggested and some, in fact,
promulgated," it remains to be seen how easily institutional investors
may be able to solicit each other's votes or consent so as to act as a
group without running afoul of various SEC requirements.
While these problems generally act to restrict institutional activity,
another set of difficulties exists that may also limit institutional investor
effectiveness in the compensation area. The first concern involves the
benefits to be achieved by active compensation review. As discussed
earlier, the actual impact on corporate earnings that an excessive salary
represents is not likely to be particularly significant.° Given the costs
in terms of reputational capital expended in a compensation chal-
lenge" and time required for organization of opposition among the
Lively because of their politically-minded leadership. In contrast, private institutions, such as
mutual funds, are run by individuals with greater Financial expertise, but who have little inclina-
tion to influence management. Taylor, supra note 78, at 72. See infra notes 98-99 and accompa-
nying text. See also Anders, supra note 92, at Al (reporting that the head of Calpers is facing
pressure from his board, which is composed mostly of state officials, to limit his efforts in
influencing poorly performing companies and to concentrate instead on the management or die
pension fund itself).
99 SEC regulations define "proxy" and "solicitation" very broadly so that virtually any state-
ment of opinion to security holders is subject to costly and time-consuming filing requirements.
Rules 14a-1(f), 14a-1(1), 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1(f), 240.14a-1(1), 240.14a-3(a), 240.14a4i
(1992). In addition, all solicitations arc subject to antifraud rules which may chill communications
in a hotly-contested proxy fight. Rule 14a-9a, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1992). Black, Disclosure,
supra note 83, at 53-57. See infra note 96 for a discussion of recent changes to these rules. See
also Black, Agents, supra note 17, at 820 n.9; Coffee, supra note 79, at 1342-45; Conard, supra
note 79, at 161-62.
9K1 The SEC recently eased the rules governing communications among shareholders. The
changes include: An exemption from the proxy rules for communications with shareholders
where the person soliciting is not seeking proxy authority and does not have a substantial interest
in the subject matter of the vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b) (1992) (amendment to Rule 14a-2(b)).
The definition of "solicitation" has been changed so that shareholders can publicly announce
how they intend to vote and provide reasons for that decision without having to comply with the
proxy rules. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-I (1) (1992) (amendment to Rule 14a-1). Solicitations conveyed
through the public media are not subject to the proxy rules so long as a definitive proxy statement
is filed with the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(0 (1992) (amendment to Rule 14a-3). In certain
transactions, companies must furnish shareholders with lists of all company shareholders. 17
C.F.R. § 240.I4a-7 (1992) (amendment to Rule 14a-7). Regulation of Communications Among
Shareholders, Exchange Act Release No. 31326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,275, 48,276 (Oct. 22, 1992).
97 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
98 See Yablon, supra note 69, at 1893.
972	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 34:937
various stockholders, it may be that the potential benefit of slightly
increased earnings due to lower compensation costs, particularly when
diluted among many holders, may not appear worth the effort. Indeed,
it would seem more expedient to expend one's energies challenging
management on the issues that have a more substantial and fundamen-
tal impact on the company's business prospects, such as expansion,
asset disposition or even general labor policy, than championing an
issue with limited impact on the company's "bottom line."
The second concern involves the interests of those managing the
large institutions. As Professor Yablon has pointed out:
Financial institutions are also run by corporate executives
who may be receiving, or be interested in receiving, compen-
sation at levels or in forms not very different from those that
are under attack from the various shareholder groups. Such
executives are unlikely to mount or join challenges to execu-
tive compensation plans because they may feel that the
compensation offered to their fellow executives is perfectly
appropriate. 99
Thus, the management structure of some of the institutional inves-
tors, may itself serve to limit active compensation oversight.
There is no doubt that institutions are becoming more restless
shareholders and have begun to demand a more active role in corpo-
rate governance. For the various reasons discussed, however, they may
never prove as effective in providing either compensation oversight or
even a more general monitoring role. This does not mean that efforts
to encourage institutional voice should cease, but this "voice" may not
bring as much positive change as earlier envisioned, particularly in the
compensation arena. 11°
E. Strengthened Compensation Committees
A final approach that has been offered to resolve the compensa-
tion controversy involves a change in the internal functioning of the
corporation's board of directors. It has been suggested that there be a
reformation of the way in which the board's compensation committee,
99 a
1 °° Recently, the head of Calpers, Dale Hansen, has received pressure from his board to limit
his shareholder activism and direct more of his energy to the pension fund's day-to-day opera-
tions. Hansen is viewed as the leader of the shareholder rights movement and his retreat could
create uncertainty as to the future activism of other large institutional investors. Anders, .supra
note 92, at Al.
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appointed to "review, analyze, and approve or revise compensation
proposals,"'"' operates to assure independent and effective oversight.
If this committee could be strengthened and made more independent
of management, then excessive compensation programs could be de-
feated before they even reach the full board for consideration. This
approach is laudable but ultimately unworkable. The problem lies not
in the functioning of this committee, but in the composition of the
board itself.
Compensation decisions by a board are generally protected by the
business judgment rule.'" As noted earlier, such decisions are immune
from attack if made by disinterested directors following an "informed"
decision-making process.'" As one way of satisfying this requirement,
most publicly-held corporations have formed compensation commit-
tees, traditionally comprised of several outside directors (those who are
not employees of the business) to examine and consider proposals for
executive compensation.'" These committees theoretically evaluate the
performance of senior management and make recommendations on
compensation formulas to the full board. Frequently, a company's
management engages compensation consultants to study the subject
company's executive salary scheme and to advise its committee on its
appropriateness. These outside advisors examine compensation scales
at companies of similar size, similar profitability and in similar indus-
tries to determine the reasonableness of each proposed plan.'" The
lin Barris, supra note 2, at 75. See also CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 242-45 (arguing that
compensation committees hire their own independent compensation consultants and establish
more formal procedures for determining compensation); James W. Fisher, Jr., The Role of the
Compensation Committee, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE FOR THE 1990s 366,
369-71 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991) (suggesting that compensation committees should, among
other things, establish a charter which clearly designates the committee's responsibilities and its
relationship to management); Lance Berger, New Initiatives for the Compensation Committee,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1985, at 33 (detailing how compensation committees can become
more proactive and link payment strategy and performance of the company). Cf. Frederick W.
Cook, Executive Pay and the Board, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1992, at 43 (arguing that
compensation committees should not hire their own consultants),
102 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
103 Id.
I04 Recent studies indicate that between 84 and 99 percent of large publicly-held corporations
have compensation committees. See Fisher, supra note 101, at 366 (citing J.E. Richard, Compen-
sation Committee Issues, 1989, DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY, June 1989, at 3); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 16, at § 3A.05. Compensations committees should be composed entirely
of outside directors, Id.
10SThe American Law Institute recommends that large publicly-held corporations establish
compensation committees to provide oversight on compensation issues. The committees should
actively review existing compensation programs and recommend methods that ensure that pay-
ments are reasonably related to executive performance. PRINCIPLES or CORPORATE GovrANANcr,
supra note 16, § 3A.05. Traditionally, however, compensation committees have been relatively
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presence of only outside directors on such committees and the absten-
tion of interested officers from compensation voting removes any self-
dealing taint from such decisions and eliminates any challenge on
self-dealing grounds. Moreover, the retention of independent consult-
ants to advise the compensation committee and the committee's rec-
ommendations to the full board following extensive discussion with the
consultants assure that the informed decision-making process required
by the business judgment rule has been met and that the board's
compensation decisions will thus be protected.
If compensation committees functioned in the truly independent
fashion envisioned in their origination, then there would be little
controversy over excessive compensation. The outside directors com-
prising the committees, bolstered by the efforts of independent com-
pensation consultants, would bargain effectively with management to
produce compensation packages that were the result of serious nego-
tiation and not simple acquiescence on demand. Unfortunately, for
reasons inherent in present board composition and structure, this is
unlikely to occur. As noted earlier, many larger public corporations,
due to atomistic shareholding patterns and ineffective communication
among shareholders, are subject to management capture. 106 No one
passive. Critics argue that most compensation committees simply rubber-stamp compensation
plans submitted to them by consultants hired by management. CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 42-50;
Berger, supra note 101, at 33-34; Joann S. Lublin, Compensation Panels Get More Assertive, Hiring
Consultants and Sparking Clashes, WALL ST. j., July 15,1992, at Bl. This passivity may be changing.
Twenty percent of major corporations' compensation committees have hired their own compen-
sation consultants to get a second opinion on executive pay plans. Id.
According to Professor Crystal, a former compensation consultant, executives use such
consultants to justify their salaries to the compensation committee. The compensation consultant
has a variety of techniques at his disposal to accomplish this task. First, the consultant will compare
the executive's compensation plan with the plans at similar companies to determine whether the
executive is being paid competitively. The executive and the consultant can manipulate this
process by including in the survey companies which are not obviously similar to the subject
company, but which have executives which are paid excessively. In addition, the executive may
ask the compensation consultant to limit his company comparisons to certain categories of pay.
For example, if the executive has a substantial salary, but does not receive options, he can ask
the consultant to survey the option grants of similar companies and not their salary policies,
explaining that he will hire the consultant to do a salary comparison next year. Inevitably, the
comparisons will reveal that the executive must be given more stock options, even if the execu-
tive's base salary dwarfs the salaries of executives in comparable companies. Not only must the
executive's pay be competitive, but it must provide the proper incentives. Thus, after determining
a competitive level of pay based on comparisons with other companies, the consultant will
structure an incentive payment package based on a variety of market and qualitative measures
so that the executive will be paid additional amounts for any improvements in the company's
performance. CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 42-60. See also Burchman, supra note 25, at 189; Yablon,
supra note 69, at 1877-81.
1 °6 See supra note 20 and accompanying text_
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shareholder or shareholding group possesses enough shares to exer-
cise control of the corporation through the election of a majority of
the board. Instead, incumbent management, through control of the
proxy process, fills the power vacuum and nominates its own candi-
dates for board membership. 107 The board of directors, theoretically
composed of representatives of various shareholding groups, is instead
peopled by individuals selected by management.
Serving on such boards are the officers themselves, individuals
performing various professional services for the corporation, such as
lawyers and investment bankers, and, finally, those with no real profes-
sional attachment to the enterprise other than board membership. 108
The first two groups, because of their employment or financial rela-
tionship to management, may find it difficult to exercise independent
oversight. The third group (from which the membership of the com-
pensation committee is recruited) will rarely challenge management
prerogative either, although there have been recent exceptions.m" Such
board members are usually selected either by the chairman or other
senior management and they possess extensive professional and per-
sonal ties to the officers that compromise their effectiveness as moni-
tors."' These directors are often officers of other public corporationsw
and frequently ask their counterparts, whom they oversee, to serve as
members of their own boards. Gross-directorships are not uncom-
mon. 112
There are three problems with such arrangements that lead to
ineffective oversight. First, personal and psychic ties to the individuals
who are responsible for one's appointment to a board make it difficult
1 °7 See id.
wsSee supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between
"inside" and "outside" directors.
1 °9 See supra notes 21 and 32.
II° See supra note 21 and accompanying text. See also CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 224-30;
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 17, at 884. But see Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New
System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHL L. REv, 187, 247
(arguing that directors need not have an adversarial relationship with management to be effec-
tive).
111 Barris, supra note 2, at 76.
132 /d. at 76, 78 n.113. A recent study of 768 of the nation's largest public companies
conducted by Directorship, a consulting firm located in Westport, Connecticut, found that in 39
of the companies surveyed, the leaders of those businesses served on one another's boards in a
"cross-directorship" phenomenon. The study further detailed that in five of those companies, the
cross-directorships involved the boards' compensation committees. Cowan, supra note 14, at Cl.
The five compensation committee cross-directorships were BE Goodrich Co. and Kroger Co.;
Conagra, Inc. and Valmont Industries, Inc.; Kellogg Co. and Upjohn Co.; Sunoco Products Co.
and NationsBank Corp.; and Allergan, Inc, and Beckman Instruments, Inc. Id,
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to engage in necessary confrontation. It is always tough to challenge a
friend—particularly where the challenging party may one day, as an
officer of another enterprise, end up in the same position. Second,
conflict with a manager who is also a member of one's own board may
lead to future retribution on one's own turf, thus reducing the incen-
tive to act. Third, where one owes one's board position to the largesse
of management, any action taken that is inimical to management may
result in a failure to be renominated to the board, which, given the
large fees paid to directors" 3 and great reputational advantage to board
membership, may function as an effective club to stifle dissension.
Such realities hinder effective oversight by a corporation's outside
directors. Because the compensation committees are peopled by such
outside directors, it is highly questionable whether, on compensation
matters, these individuals possess the kind of independence from man-
agement necessary to function as effective bargainers for the corporate
interest."'
Indeed, because of these relational realities, compensation mat-
ters are particularly susceptible to management influence. The single
most sensitive issue to an employee relating to his employment is
compensation. Few issues cause as much excitement or resentment as
how much one is to be paid. A confrontation with a manager over
compensation has the potential to breed more towards a com-
plaining director than any other kind of policy dispute. Given the
outside director's personal ties to management and the lucrative na-
ture of a board seat, there is very little incentive to engage in a dispute
with an executive over salary. Such a confrontation will breed tremen-
dous resentment and may result in that director's failure to be renomi-
nated at the next board election." 3 Furthermore, considering that
''For example, non-employee directors receive annual compensation in the amount of
$35,000 at Exxon, $55,000 at IBM, $48,000 at American Express, and $35,000 at General Electric.
Moreover, these non-employee directors usually receive a fee of between $1,000 and $2,000 for
each meeting attended. In addition, committee chairmen usually receive a supplemental retainer
of between $3,000 and $5,000 per annum. AMERICAN EXPRESS CO., Mar. 14, 1991 PROXY STATE-
MENT, at 7 (1991); EXXON CORP., Mar. 6, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 5 (1992); INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINES CORP., Mar. 16, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 10 (1992); GENERAL ELECTRIC
CO., Mar. 3, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 13 (1992). See also Barris, supra note 2, at 78 n.1 14, 79.
114 In addition, most compensation committee members do not have the expertise to evaluate
compensation packages proposed by consultants properly.
They are, for the most part, not very adept at statistics and corporate finance, and
they may not he able to follow the consultant's sophisticated reasoning. Further,
they have no counsel of their own to tell them that what the consultant is saying is
or is not true. So they may either fall asleep or look repeatedly at their watches in
such a way that the consultant will not fail to notice. CRYSTAL., supra note 31, at 50.
115 1d. at 226-27; Barris, supra note 2, at 79.
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executive compensation has little bearing on a large company's overall
profits, why would an individual risk a lucrative board seat on an issue
sure to inflame passions but also certain to have minimal impact on
corporate performance? Finally, because many outside directors are
also officers of other large corporations, it is not in their own self-in-
terest to object too strenuously to generous compensation, for the
higher their peers' compensation tends to be, the richer their own
packages may become." 6
This reality makes it extraordinarily difficult for an outside direc-
tor in a management-dominated enterprise to engage in the sort of
active bargaining with executives over compensation that will result in
reasonable salary arrangements. Despite the existence of a compensa-
tion committee theoretically comprised of "independent" outsiders to
monitor compensation, the very composition of most boards in the
large public corporation setting limits the effectiveness of that suppos-
edly independent body. A compensation committee is only as inde-
pendent as its members, and in the typical management-captured
corporation, given the predilections of most outside directors, that
independence is likely to be minimal.
Despite these problems that may lead to the ineffectiveness of a
compensation committee and the full board for that matter, in issues
relating to executive compensation, each director is still subject to legal
requirements as to conduct that should theoretically compel effective
action. Unfortunately, the threat of legal liability has little impact on
director behavior or effectiveness. Ideally, a director should carry out
his or her responsibilities "with the care that an ordinarily prudent
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and
under similar circumstances. "' 17 This would seem to compel circum-
spect and diligent conduct in executive salary negotiations. Under the
business judgment rule, however, a director may be found to have met
this duty of care, if in making a specific business decision, he or she
has acted without self-interest, in an informed manner and with a
rational belief that the decision is in the best interests of the corpora-
116 Barris, supra note 2, at 78. See also CRYSTAL, ,Capra note 31, at 227-28 (observing that a
CEO can ensure high compensation by placing other company CEOs with pay packages rivaling
his own on the compensation committee).
117 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 16, § 4.01(a). Approximately 37 states
have adopted statutory duty of care provisions; the rest have a common law duty of care. Id. at
200. Most states have adopted a reasonable care standard. Id. at n.15. See also 2 MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT ANN. 3d § 8.30, at 934 (1090); CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 717 (McKinney 1986); Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg, Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963);
but see, e.g., KY. REV, STAT. ANN. § 2718.8-300(1) (Baldwin 1989) ("A director shall discharge his
duties ... [On a manner he honestly believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.").
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tion. 1 i 8
 A director who so acts in reaching a business decision is then
protected from any legal liability to his or her shareholders.
This standard of care is not very difficult to satisfy, particularly in
the compensation area. Provided that the directors are to receive none
of the compensation they are voting on and the decision is not "so
removed from the realm of reason" as to appear absolutely irrational
(few decisions could ever be so characterized), two of the business
judgment rule's three elements have been met."' Most challenges to
a particular board decision involve the third requirement, that an
informed decision was made. How exactly does one demonstrate that a
decision was informed? The Delaware Supreme Court's landmark rul-
ing in Smith v. Van Gorkom' 2° created a number of important guideposts
to informed decisionmaking. In addition to requiring that a board
spend a proper amount of time making a particular decision,m the
court also suggested that the retention of some independent third-
party advisor might assist a board in meeting the "informed" require-
ment.' 22 Consequently, a compensation committee's decisions may be
labeled "informed" and, thus, protected, upon a showing that the
committee has no actual interest in the salary recommendations it is
considering, has spent a significant amount of time discussing com-
pensation proposals, and has relied on the advice of a third-party
advisor as to the appropriateness of a particular salary package. And,
in due course, the full board itself is entitled to rely upon the recom-
mendation of its compensation committee when approving a salary
proposal in order to meet its own obligations under the business
judgment rule and, thus, reduce any threat of shareholder liability.'"
The retention of an independent compensation consultant insu-
118 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 16, § 4.01(c). Where a director has
not made a business decision, such as in cases of omission, the business judgment rule does not
apply and the director should be judged under the reasonable care standard. See Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
1111 FRINCIPI.F.S OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Supra note 16, § 4.01(c) cmt. f.
120 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
121 Id. at 874 (holding that the board of directors was grossly negligent when it approved the
sale of the company with only two hours of deliberation).
122 Id. at 876-88. See generally Charles M. Elson, Fairness Opinions: Are They Fair or Should
We Care?, 53 Onto	 L REV. 951 (1992).
123 See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1460 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hen a
board's enactment of a course of action merely effectuates the plans of a disinterested directors'
committee, the board's action is prima facie subject to the protections of the business judgment
rule."). See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. When a compensation plan is not approved
by a majority of disinterested directors, the burden of proof shifts from the shareholder challeng-
ing the plan to the directors, who must prove that the plan was fair to the corporation. Cohen
v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th Cir. 1979).
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lates both the compensation committee and the full board from liabil-
ity. Theoretically, the use of a third-party advisor would help to ensure
director probity in compensation decisionmaking. This, of course,
assumes that the consultant acts in an objective and independent
manner when advising the directors. Unfortunately, this is rarely the
case. There are two fundamental problems in the structure of the
consultant/corporation relationship that undercut objectivity. First,
these advisors are generally hired by management and frequently per-
form multiple tasks for the corporation)" Thus, there is a powerful
disincentive for recommending a salary structure that management
would consider inadequate. It is difficult to cross the party who has
engaged you, particularly if the promise of future dealings with that
party or friends of that party lie in the offing. 125
Second, compensation structuring is not a precise art or science.
It is based on comparisons with what other business are paying. There
is tremendous subjectivity involved in deciding with what businesses
the client's compensation structure will be compared. The consultant
may look at companies in the same industry, differing types of busi-
nesses of similar size, or even companies with a similar profitability
picture—the universe is practically infinite, limited only by the number
of businesses in existence. Moreover, the relative weight given to each
element is also completely up to the advisor. 126 The high level of
subjectivity inherent in compensation analysis and the reengagement
concerns discussed above, have left consultants prone to management
capture in the same way that investment bankers who render corporate
fairness opinions lack independence from the corporation that has
retained them)27 As a result, the advice given by a compensation
consultant potentially lacks the objectivity and independence neces-
124 For example, Towers Perrin, the largest compensation consulting firm also designs em-
ployee pension and health plans for companies. CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 219-20.
125 1d. at 218-19.
126 Id. at 42-50, See supra note 105.
127 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and
What Can Be Done About It?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27 (1989); William" Carney, Fairness Opinions: How
Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 %Vasil. U. L.Q. 523 (1992); Elsou„supra
note 122. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
See also Suein L. Hwang, Ties That Bind, Fired Tambrands CEO Was Unusually Close to a
Consulting Finn, WALL Sr. J., Aug 23, 1993, at Al. Immediately following the ouster of Tambrands
Chairman and Chief Executive Martin C. Emmett, the corporation terminated all contracts with
Personnel Corporation of America (PCA). PCA, a corporation with which Emmett bad close
personal ties, is a human resources firm that had been retained to advise the board of directors
concerning, among other matters, executive compensation. As a result of PCA's efforts, Emmett
received a lucrative benefit package and options to purchase close to 600,000 Tambrands shares.
Judith Fischer, publisher of Executive Compensation Reports, says that "it is, or can be, an
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sary to assure a compensation package reasonably related to an execu-
tive's professional contributions. This compensation consultant "for
hire" phenomenon, particularly when combined with compensation
committees comprised of outside directors who may be unwilling to
challenge management results in compensation arrangements that are
acquiesced to and not bargained for, and, thus, are potentially unrea-
sonable.' 28
 Unfortunately, these arrangements enjoy legal protection
through the operation of the business judgment rule, administered by
a judiciary reluctant to involve itself in compensation disputes.' 29
Although a board's use of a compensation committee comprised
exclusively of outside directors has the theoretical potential to create
reasoned compensation schemes, this solution is entirely predicated
on finding outside directors who are unwilling to compromise their
objectivity in the face of management capture. This potential may
never be realized given the current state of the outside directorship in
the typical large public corporation and the ready availability of possi-
bly corruptible outside compensation consultants. How, then, can a
compensation committee be made more effective? The solution does
not lie in making the consultants more independent of management—
their desire for future retention and the subjectivity inherent in the
analytic process have rendered this a most difficult goal. Rather, an
approach must be found to promote independent and responsible
behavior on the part of the outside directors. Simply mandating that
compensation decisions be made exclusively by outside directors will
accomplish little; only if these directors are truly independent in mo-
tivation, will the dispassionate bargaining requisite to reasonable com-
pensation ever occur.'" Strengthening the compensation committees
will have negligible impact, unless those who comprise these bodies
are given sufficient motivation to act effectively. This seems unlikely to
occur under the current scheme of director appointment and reten-
tion.
F. Summary
The various proposals for attacking the problem of executive
overcompensation, whether involving heightened disclosure, tax-based
incestuous relationship," when a chief hires a compensation consultant to advise the board
concerning executive compensation. Id.
128 See CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 214-40; Ina see Cook, supra note 101, at 43,45 (observing
that the best compensation consultants are not advocates for the CEO, but merely provide
independent, objective advice).
125 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
um) CRYSTAL, supra note 31, at 224-28; Barris, supra note 2, at 77-78. See supra notes 112-16
and accompanying text.
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remedies, judicial involvement, institutional shareholder activism or
strengthened board compensation committees will ultimately prove
ineffective and, worse still, may even jeopardize corporate well-being.
Although they may attack the problem from various angles, these
proposals fail to strike at the heart of the issue. The real solution to
overcompensation lies with stimulating effective board oversight. This
must take place from within the boardroom itself. Solutions that at-
tempt to change board behavior through external pressure may effect
some positive results, but they do not tackle the problem that created
the overcompensation issue in the first place. The board must act as
its own motivational force. External pressure will have an impact only
so long as it continues to be applied. Once the pressure is reduced due
to public apathy, the problem will resurface. The only long-term solu-
tion is to create a corporate regime based on board self-motivation.
Only then will the board function as the effective monitoring force
both as to compensation and general corporate affairs for which it was
originally created.
III. Tut: EQUITY-BAS ED APPROACH
The overcompensation controversy is the result of unchecked
self-interest on the part of management and passive indifference by
the corporation's board of directors. Because personal greed created
the problem, a similar appeal to individual interest may resolve it.
Externally-based pressure on a board to bargain effectively with man-
agement overcompensation, as noted earlier, is an ineffective ap-
proach. There is a much simpler and efficacious method to reposition
the board as a counter-force to management in the compensation area.
A. Stock Ownership
The outside directors must be made to consider executive com-
pensation proposals from the viewpoint of the company's stockholders
to whom they are legally obligated instead of from the perspective of
ones beholden to management. It is the stockholders who stand to lose
the most from unreasonable compensation arrangements. Thus, it is
crucial that the company's outside directors re-align their interests and
thinking with those of the shareholders. The most effective way of
creating such perspective is to appeal directly to these directors' per-
sonal pecuniary interests. The outside directors must not remain mere
observers of the corporate enterprise, but must become active equity
participants. If a director's personal capital is potentially affected by
an excessive compensation package, that director is much less likely to
acquiesce to such a proposal. It is easy to spend other people's money
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freely; it is always much more difficult to be inattentively lavish with
what one considers to be one's own funds.
By becoming equity-holders, the outside directors would assume
a personal stake in the success or failure of the enterprise) Decisions
that had a negative impact upon the business would be collaterally
harmful to their own personal financial interests. Thus, director de-
mand for effective management would no longer be the result of
compliance with distant legal requirements, or vaguely understood
pressures from outside institutions, but would emanate from within.
Directors would have a substantial personal interest in creating an
efficient and competitive management structure. To demand less
would be disadvantageous to their own financial well-being.
Equity ownership would act to counter the pressures placed on
the outside directors as a result of management capture. It is very hard
to resist the demands of individuals to whom you owe your position
when your involvement in the venture is limited to the fee you receive
for your services and the continuance of that fee is subject to the will
of management. Possessing an actual stake in the venture itself alters
the nature of this relationship considerably. In addition to the consid-
eration that the active monitoring of management may lead to eventual
replacement, an outside director must also consider that the failure to
exercise effective oversight may also result in the diminution of that
individual's personal wealth. Under such an arrangement, it would not
be quite so easy to simply acquiesce to the demands of management.
Nowhere would the positive effect of a personally-motivated out-
side directorship be more evident than in the area of executive com-
pensation. Overcompensation is the result of ineffective bargaining.
131 The benefits of outside director stock ownership have been well-documented. See, e.g.,
MACE, supra note 15, at 61-65 (outside directors who own substantial amounts of stock in their
company are more likely to ask discerning questions than non-stockholding outside directors);
Louis Fernandez, Tax Deferral, Capital Gains, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1985, at 51 (discuss-
ing tax advantages of stock payments); James J. Fitzsimmons, A Better Approach to Director Pay,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 1992, at 48,49-50 (directors paid in stock are more closely aligned
with shareholders and are in a better position to ensure that top management is paid based on
its performance); Edmund W. Littlefield, A Stake with Restricted Stock, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,
Spring 1985, at 51,52 ("Paying directors in meaningful amounts of restricted stock gives them a
common stake with the shareholders."). See also Pearl Meyer, The Rise of the Outside Director As
an Equity Owner, DIRECTORS & Bo/kilns, Spring 1986, at 41 (observing that, historically, directors
owned large amounts of stock and that companies may be returning to this compensation
strategy).
Brown Brothers Harriman's Lawrence Tucker, who served as a director on one particular
corporate board that had an average director investment of nearly one million dollars, described
that group as a "board that pays attention, . .. I've never seen pocket calculators come out so
quickly in my life." Finance, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, July 7,1993 at 4.
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People without great incentive to press for position rarely do. Equity
ownership would align the position of the outside director with that of
the group most disadvantaged by unreasonable compensation, the
shareholders. It would provide an incentive to bargain not out of a
sense of duty to some indistinguishable mass of stockholders, but duty
to one's own interest. Given the fundamental fact of human nature
that all are susceptible to the vice of envy, no one delights in providing
a financial windfall to another, most especially when it comes out of
one's own pocket. It is galling enough to see someone overpaid for
their efforts; it is all the more galling to be the vehicle for such
overpayment, particularly when the ill-gotten gain results in the per-
ceived diminution of one's own wealth. This dynamic would set an
appropriate tone for compensation negotiations between management
and equity-holding outside directors, and, in turn, create the sort of
active bargaining that would lead to more reasoned compensation.
B. Lengthened Director Terms
Very often, though, outside directors do in fact hold stock in the
companies they serve. If equity ownership has any motivational impact
or potential, why then are these directors still so susceptible to man-
agement capture? It is not that the possession of an equity position in
a venture has no impact on director motivation, but the fact that these
directors' stockholdings in their companies are insubstantial compared
with the monetary and reputational compensation they receive for
board service. In the typical large public corporation, many of the
outside directors own relatively small amounts of company stock. 132
112 For example, the holdings of a few noted outside directors at several larger public
corporations are as follows:
DIRECTOR SHARES DIRECTOR SHARES
Bank of Boston Donald Monan 0 Philip Morris	 Rupert Murdoch 400
Thomas B. Wheeler 236 Richard Parsons 500
Alfred M. Zeien 500 Sears Roebuck	 Mandell de Windt 450
IBM Harold Brown 321 Norma Pace 400
Nannerl Keohanc 321 Nancy C. Reynolds 454
Richard Munro 421 Ralston Purina	 David Banks 200
Mobil Donald Fites 200 Francis Ferguson 556
Disney Robert Stern
Stanley Gold 250
Samuel Williams 480
Gary Wilson 0
Bank of Boston Corp., February 26, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 6 (1992); INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS MACHINE CORP., Mar. 16, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 11 (1992); Moan. CORP., Mar. 18,
1991 PROXY STATEMENT, at 7, 10 (1991); PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES INC., Mar. 7, 1991 PROXY
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Their major stake in the venture is the fee they receive each year for
board service. Such fees, particularly in the larger corporations, may
well exceed $40,000 per annum—no small reward for a position involv-
ing the attendance of only a few meetings a year.'" In addition, the
social and reputational advantages for board service are obvious. The
more prestigious the company on whose board an individual sits, the
more influential one is considered in the business community, leading
to other opportunities for financial benefit. 134
 Outside directors may
sometimes supplement their fees with lucrative consulting contracts
provided by solicitous management. The most glaring example of this
phenomenon occurred during the leadership of F. Ross Johnson, the
legendary CEO of RJR/Nabisco, who had placed several outside direc-
tors on the company payroll prior to the leveraged buy-out that even-
tually cost Johnson his job.'"
Generally, the cumulative annual fees paid to each outside direc-
tor, particularly when considered over the multi-year terms of typical
board membership, involve considerably more money than the usual
value of that director's stockholdings in the business. Most business
decisions involve a consideration of both the costs and benefits of the
contemplated strategy. When an outside director makes a decision that
challenges management prerogative, that director, in a management-
controlled enterprise, risks retribution from the dominant executives
that might involve the failure to be renominated to the board at the
next election. Obviously, before making such a decision, the director
STATEMENT, at 12 (1991); RALSTON PURINA Co., December 10, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT, at 8-9
(1991); SEARS ROEBUCK & CO., Mar. 21, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT, at 6 (1991); WALT DISNEY CORP.,
Dec. 27, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT, at 2 (1991).
133
 Remuneration for non-employee directors often exceeds $40,000 including their annual
retainer, the fee received for attending meetings, and any additional compensation they may
receive for chairing committees. See .supra note 113. Often remuneration goes beyond annual
compensation and payments for meetings attended. For example, each non-employee director
at Eastman Kodak is covered by group term life insurance in the amount of $100,000. Non-em-
ployee directors at American Express, who have served at least five years, are eligible to receive
$30,000 per annum upon their retirement from the board. These payments continue for a
number of years equal to the time served on the board or until death. Similarly, General Electric's
non-employee directors, who have served at least five years, are over 65 years of age, and retire
directly from the board, are eligible to receive either an annual payment for life equal to the
amount of the last retainer received or a $450,000 life insurance policy. AMERICAN EXPRESS, Mar.
14, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT, at 7 (199 I ); EASTMAN KODAK CO., Mar. 18, 1991 PROXY STATEMENT,
at 8 (1991); GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., Mar. 3, 1992 PROXY STATEMENT, at 13 (1992). See Bruce
Overton, Remuneration of Outside Directors, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: A STRATEGIC GUIDE
FOR THE 1990s 383 (Fred K. Foulkes ed., 1991).
154 See MACE, supra note 15, at 87-91; Overton, supra note 133, at 383.
15 See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE 97-98 (Harper Peren-
nial 1991). At the time of the LBO, RJR Nabisco's outside directors were among the highest paid
directors in American industry. Overton, supra note 133, at 388.
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will, consciously or not, weigh the various benefits such a decision
entails, with any attendant costs. Where a director's stockholdings in a
given corporation are substantially less than the income that a director
receives in fees, the potential loss of such fees may weigh more heavily
in that director's mind than any beneficial increase in stock value that
might result from the corporate efficiencies created. This would ex-
plain management "capture" even in situations where the outside di-
rectors have equity positions in their companies. The key, then, is not
merely stock ownership but substantial ownership.
At what threshold do holdings become "substantial"? To have a
salutary impact on director behavior, equity ownership by outside di-
rectors must be significant enough to affect a director's decision-mak-
ing process. An outside director's shareholding position must be large
enough that, in deciding a particular course of action, concern about
how that decision will positively affect equity value will subsume tradi-
tional desires to placate fee-paying management. A director's personal
shareholdings must weigh more heavily in that individual's decision-
making process than fee maintenance concerns. The value of that
individual's equity interest in the business must exceed the amount to
be obtained through continued fee income. If a director's personal
interest in the company's stock were to exceed the annual compensa-
tion and prestige value of board membership, perhaps that individual
would be less willing to side continually and complacently with man-
agement when such behavior could have a negative impact on the
company's market value and, thus, on his or her personal holdings.
We must make it in the director's own self-interest to challenge and
monitor management. A large equity position in the business would
go far toward accomplishing this goal. But how can we create a stake
large enough to induce favored behavior?
To create the appropriate equity incentive, the corporation should
simply pay the directors their annual fee in company common stock.
As compensation for the exercise of oversight as a board member, it
seems only natural that each director should be rewarded with an
interest in the business itself. In addition, the company should make
a limited cash payment to each equity-compensated director to cover
any income taxes that may be imposed as the result of such stock
grants. To prevent the quick liquidation of these stock payments and
consequent loss of equity-based incentive, the stock awarded must be
restricted as to resale during the individual's directorship. 136
"6 To alleviate any potential liquidity concerns that a director may have as the result Of such
restriction, the corporation may allow the individual to pledge the restricted stock as collateral
1ir either a company-sponsored or third-party loan.
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Although such a compensation system will create substantial stock-
holdings in the hands of the previously complacent outside directors,
a few problems remain. As noted earlier, to have any sort of favorable
impact on director behavior, the amount of stock that each director
holds must be reasonably substantial. The key is to provide each indi-
vidual with a block large enough to induce active monitoring. Al-
though a director's yearly fee may purchase a large amount of stock,
it may not be enough to create the kind of stake that will counterbal-
ance the fear of replacement that management challenge may bring.
Therefore, a director's term of office must be expanded significantly.
Instead of being elected to a term of one to three years, directors
should instead serve for five-year terms. In addition to minimizing the
immediacy of any management replacement threat, such a term will
create in each director both an immediate equity stake and, without
yearly re-election concerns, the promise of a fixed number of future
stock grants. Five years' worth of fees paid in company stock should
result in the accumulation of a reasonably substantial equity position
for each director.'" Moreover, because of the fixed five-year term, the
beneficial impact of equity ownership will manifest itself throughout
the period of board service. A director will either possess the stock
itself or the expectancy of a certain five-year accumulation that will
provide similar incentive.
The quinquennial election of directors is not a new proposal.
Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum, two prominent corporate prac-
titioners, have recently advocated such a change in board structure,
along with a host of other major governance reforms.'" They suggest
that the creation of a five-year fixed term of office will create a corpo-
rate "long-term view" highly beneficial to corporate "vitality."'" The
main goal of their proposal, however, involves the creation of a corpo-
rate governance model "that will lead managers and stockholders to
work cooperatively towards the corporation's long-term business sue-
I 37 For example, if a director is paid $35,000 per annum, at the conclusion of his term, he
should own $175,000 in company stock. If he receives $50,000 per year, he would complete his
term with $250,000 worth of stock.
138
 Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 110, at 187. The quinquennial election of directors is
one part of Lipton and Rosenblum's proposal for comprehensive reform of the present corporate
governance system. Their proposal would also bar nonconsensual changes in control between
elections; provide major shareholders with access to corporate proxy materials relating to elec-
tions of directors; require a detailed five-year report on the company's performance and a
prospective five-year plan; and tie management compensation awards and penalties to the cor-
poration's performance against the plan. Id. at 190.
139 /d. at 216.
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cess." 14° Their arguments advocating term expansion focus primarily
on creating a management/shareholder "long term" cooperation re-
lationship, rather than corporate productivity through active director
oversight."' Despite this goal, their call for a longer range perspective
on company affairs, an obvious by-product of five-year director terms,
is a laudable and desirable result. Who can really argue with manage-
ment and boards of directors making decisions with the long-term
health of the enterprise in mind? Some of Lipton's and Rosenbluni's
other proposals, especially those promoting the hindrance of changes
of corporate control, are more problematic. They should not detract,
however, from the potential benefits of quinquennial director terms.
If five-year terms can be combined with equity grants, an effective
incentive for active director monitoring will be created, resulting in
greater productivity and responsibility to the equity-holders in the
executive compensation area.
There are two potential drawbacks, however, to lengthened direc-
tor terms. First, such terms may make corporate changes of control
much more difficult to accomplish, and second, they could lead to the
possible entrenchment of ineffective or even disloyal directors. These
problems are not as dramatic as they would appear at initial glance.
First, shareholders always have the right to remove a director for
cause, 142 a power which should resolve the problem of the disloyal or
inattentive director. Second, provision could be made to allow share-
holder removal of directors without cause, which should ease any
potential chilling effect of the proposal on changes of corporate con-
trol. However, given the more active director behavior this proposal
should entail, changes of control would not appear so necessary to
compel effective management. Moreover, the "long view" perspective
such a lengthened term may provide to the outside directors, no longer
subject to the pressures of annual election, also weighs heavily in its
favor. Directors, now possessing a five-year time horizon, will find it
easier to make decisions that offer the promise of strong returns over
the long term, even though they may have a negative impact on
profitability in the short-run. The five-year term has, thus, great poten-
tial.
' 40 Id. at 189.
141 1d. at 224-52.
142 See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew's Inc., 1'34 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d
590 (N.Y. 1954). Some state statutes have modified the common law rule and allow shareholders
to remove directors without cause. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 303(a) (West 1990); Rev. MonEt.
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.08 (1984); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706 (McKinney 1986). See also CARY
& EISENIW.RG, supra note 44, at 153-54.
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C. Potential Costs
Of course, as no approach to resolving a particular corporate
problem comes without its costs, we must consider the negative impact
an equity-based approach may entail. One difficulty that increased
equity-ownership may create involves the possible chilling of positive
risk-taking behavior by the outside directors. A business will only pros-
per by the amount of risk management is willing to take. The greater
the risk taken, the greater the potential return to the shareholders. It
may be argued that outside directors who own large amounts of com-
pany stock, particularly those with limited outside assets, will have such
a significant portion of their personal wealth tied to company stock
that they will have an incentive to demand that management adopt a
more conservative risk-taking posture. While such an approach may
preserve the value of these individual's personal holdings through the
steady maintenance of corporate assets, it will concurrently deter the
sort of aggressive behavior that brings the potential of significant profit
and asset growth. Unfortunately, these individuals would have no op-
portunity to increase their personal tolerance to risk through the
portfolio diversification techniques other investors utilize, because they
would be forced to hold unsalable restricted stock.
This problem, although not insignificant, is not as troubling as it
would initially appear. It assumes that the commitment of a large
portion of one's assets to a single enterprise inevitably leads to conser-
vative behavior. This is not always the case. Many successful entrepre-
neurs have most of their personal wealth invested in their businesses.
This does not discourage, but rather acts to encourage risk, for the
ultimate goal of wealth accumulation that motivates these individuals
cannot be met without risk. They achieved success through risk and
their stockholdings encouraged still greater risk because of the poten-
tial to share in the larger returns such risk brings. What about those
in business who are not entrepreneurial in spirit, but who possess a
more restrained, managerial bent? For such individuals, unless they
possess significant holdings in other ventures, the commitment of a
large portion of their personal wealth to the company on whose board
they sit may discourage risk-taking. On the other hand, can it be said
that a fee-based compensation program will act conversely to stimulate
risk-taking behavior? Not necessarily. In fact, this is why there has been
a shift in recent years to creating compensation programs for corporate
management that result in executive equity accumulation rather than
simple cash payments. One goal is to encourage risk-taking, rather
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than position preservation.'" Creating equity positions in outside di-
rectors may have the same impact.
Although some individuals are risk-averse by nature (and, indeed,
the presence on a board of such persons may even be a welcome
counterbalance to those with excessive dare), it is not at all clear that
the payment of directors' fees in cash encourages risk-positive behav-
ior. As noted earlier, in the typical management-captured corporation,
the expectation of continued fee income leads to passive conduct
ultimately harmful to corporate productivity. Risk averse individuals
are particularly susceptible to such pressure. Creation of an equity-
based incentive as an antidote to director passivity may produce the
positive impact on behavior that will far outweigh any potential danger
of elevated risk aversion among a few individuals. In fact, the impact
may be risk neutral (for some may be inherently risk-averse) or even
risk-positive.
A second disadvantage of equity-based director compensation may
be the exclusion from the pool of potential directors of those who
would rather be compensated for their activities with cash. It could be
argued that by refusing to compensate in cash, a corporation could
deprive itself of the services of a large group of talented individuals.
No such loss would occur by paying cash fees, for a company could
attract the involvement of both those who desire cash and those who
would prefer equity (these individuals could easily convert their cash
payments into company stock). This argument misses the point. It was
the payment of fees in cash that, in the management-captured enter-
prise, created the passivity that led to oversight-driven productivity
problems in the first place. A director who would demand only cash
and refuse to take an equity position in the enterprise might be just
the sort of individual who should not serve as a monitor of manage-
ment behavior. 144 Of course, a director is not giving up the right to
143 See, e.g., Michael C. Jenson & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—Iry Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARI!. Bus. RF:v., May-June 1990, at 138, 141 ("By controlling a meaningful
percentage of total corporate equity, senior managers experience a direct and powerful 'feedback
effect' from changes in market value."); Stephen F. O'Byrne, Linking Management Incentives to
Shareholder Wealth, J. CORP, Acct. . & FIN., Autumn 1991, at 91, 97; Alisa J. Baker, Stock Options—A
Perk Thal Built Silicon Valley, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A20; Gilbert Fuchsberg, Former Critic
of Big Stock Plans For CEOs Now Supports Them, WALL. ST . J., Dec. 16, 1992, at 111; but see Amanda
Bennett, Taking Stock: Big Firms Rely More on Options but Fail to End Pay Criticism, WALL Si. J.,
Mar. 11, 1992, at Al.
144 One commentator states that he will not. serve on public company boards unless he can
make a substantial cash investment in the company. This large investment allows him to get
involved in nearly every facet of the business, which in turn creates a chalice to earn a substantial
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compensation by being paid in stock. The form of compensation is
simply being varied. Indeed, to decline to serve simply because of a
non-cash form of payment suggests the sort of purely mercenary men-
tality that has led to the entire problem of management capture. A
board made up of individuals willing to demonstrate a real commit-
ment to the shareholders they were elected to serve by taking an equity
position in the enterprise is a corporation's best hope. An equity-based
director compensation system will lead to the type of board composi-
tion that will maximize management productivity. And reasoned ex-
ecutive compensation will be a beneficial by-product of this approach.
D. The Empirical Evidence
Central, of course, to the effectiveness of an equity-based solution
to the compensation dilemma is the assumption that stock ownership
has a positive impact on director behavior. For this approach to suc-
ceed, there must be a link between equity ownership and more moti-
vated director behavior. An empirical examination of the executive
compensation voting behavior of boards composed of outside directors
with substantial stockholdings, compared with boards whose outside
members do not possess large equity stakes, may act to demonstrate
the potentially positive impact of an equity-based approach.
Business Week magazine, in conjunction with Standard & Poor's
Compustat Services, Inc., conducts an annual survey of 500 of the
nation's largest publicly-traded corporations in an attempt "to measure
how closely" executive compensation by those companies "matches
performance." 145 The study uses two separate approaches to rate per-
formance. The first compares an executive's compensation package
with the business's total return to shareholders in stock appreciation
and dividends over a three-year period. The second measures compen-
sation against corporate profitability for the same time period. The
survey is conducted by assigning each company examined to one of
nine industry groups. A comparison is made among those companies
in each group based on how their individual compensation programs
compared with shareholder return and company profit. A "perform-
ance rating" is then assigned to each company surveyed for each of
the two categories examined. Each business is thus rated on a scale of
I (indicating the best performance) to 5 (indicating the poorest). "The
return as well as decreases the chance of lawsuits from other shareholders. William A. Sahlman,
Why Sane People Shouldn't Serve on Public Boards, HAttv. Bus. REV., May.June 1990, at 28.
145 Byrne, supra note 2, at 148.
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top 15% of the sample receives a 1, 25% a 2, 30% a 3, 20% a 4, and
10% a 5 . ”146
Assuming that this survey, conducted by two independent organi-
zations, possesses even minimal validity in its assessment of the rela-
tionship between pay and performance, it provides an excellent start-
ing point for an empirical examination of the link, if any, between
"reasoned" compensation and outside director stock ownership. Of the
500 companies examined in the Business Week study, approximately
158' 47 were selected that possessed, in either one of the two categories
examined, either the poorest possible rating ("5") for compensation
in relation to performance, or the best ("1"). The proxy statements of
"6 Id.
147 AIheti Signal, Inc.; Alfie] Corp.; Amerada Hess Corp.; American Express Co.; American
Home Products Corp.; American International Group, Inc.; Amgen, Inc.; AMP, Inc.; Apple
Computer, Inc.; Arco Chemical Co., Atlantic Richfield Co., Automatic Data Processing, Inc.; Avon
Products, Inc.; Baker Hughes, Inc.; Baltimore Gas & Electric Co; Banc One Corp.; Bear Stearns
Companies, Inc.; Beckton Dickinson & Co.; Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.; Betz Laboratories, Inc.;
Bioniet, Inc.; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.; Burlington Northern, Inc.; Burlington Resources, inc.;
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.; Carolina Power & Light Co.; Caterpillar, Inc.; CBS, Inc.; Centerior
Energy Corp.; Central & South West Corp.; Chase Manhattan Corp.; Chemical Banking Corp.;
Chrysler Corp.; Citicorp; Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc.; Commonwealth Edison Co.; Compaq Com-
puter Corp.; Consolidated Rail Corp.; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.; Costco Wholesale Corporation;
CPC International, Inc.; CSX Corp.; Deluxe Corporation; Detroit Edison Co.; Digital Equipment
Corp.; Dominion Resources, Inc.; Dow Chemical Co.; Duke Power Co.; Eastman Kodak Co.; Ethyl
Corp.; Exxon Corp.; Federal Express Corp.; Fifth Third Bancorp, First Chicago Corp.; First
Interstate Bancorp, Fleet/Norstar Financial Group,Inc.; Ford Motor Co.; FPL Group, Inc.; Frank-
lin Resources, Inc.; Freeport-McMoran, Inc.; General Electric Co.; General Motors Corp.; Genu-
ine Parts Co.; Golden West Financial Corp.; Great Lakes Chemical Corp.; Hewlett-Packard Co.;
Hillenbrand Industries, Inc.; H.J. Heinz Co.; Home Depot, Inc.; Honeywell, Inc.; H & R Block,
inc.; Intel Corp.; International Business Machines Corp.; International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.;
ITT Corp.; Keycorp; Kimberly Clark Corp.; Liz Claiborne, Inc.; Long Island Lighting Co.; Lyon-
dell Petrochemical Co.; Maytag Corp.; MBIA, Inc.; McCormick & Co., Inc.; MCI Communications
Corp.; Mead Corp.; Medco Containment Services, Inc.; Mellon Bank Corp.; Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Inc.; Microsoft Corp.; Mobil Corp.; Molex, Inc.; Morgan Stanley Group, Inc.; Nalco Chemical Co.;
National Medical Enterprises, Inc.; Newmont Gold Co.; New York Times Co.; Nike, Inc.; Novell,
Inc.; Nucor Corp.; Nynex Corp.; Occidental Petroleum Corp.; Oracle Systems Corp.; Pacilicorp;
Pall Corp.; Paramount Communications, Inc.; Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.; Pennzoil Co.;
Phelps Dodge Corp.; Philip Morris Companies, Inc.; Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.; Premier
Industrial Corp.; Primerica Corp.; Ralston Purina Cu.; Reebok International, Ltd.; Roadway
Services, Inc.; Rubbermaid, Inc.; Safeco Corp.; Salomon, Inc.; San Diego Gas & Electric Co.;
Schlmnberger, Ltd.; Scott Paper Co.; Sears Roebuck & Co.; Southern Co.; Southern New England
Telecommunications; Stanley Works; St. Jude Medical, Inc.; Stone Container Corp.; Stryker Corp.;
Suntrust Banks, Inc.; Syntex Corp.; Tambrands, Inc.; TECO Energy, Inc.; Telecommunications,
Inc.; Tribune Co.; Tenneco, Inc.; Texaco, Inc.; Texas Instruments, Inc.; Texas Utilities Co.;
Torchmark Corp.; TRW, Inc.; T2 Medical Incorporated; Tyco Laboratories, Inc.; Union Camp
Corp.; Union Carbide Corp.; Union Pacific Corp.; UAL Corporation; United Technologies Corp.;
Unocal Corp.; Upjohn Co,; U.S. Bancorp; Walt Disney; Waste Management, Inc.; Wells Fargo &
Co.; Westinghouse Electric Corp.; Willamette Industries, Inc.; Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.; Wisconsin
Energy Corp.; Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co.
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each of these selected corporations were then reviewed to ascertain
how much company stock was held by each of the companies' outside
directors. This study then compared the stockholdings of outside di-
rectors serving on the boards with the worst ratings (indicating over-
paid executives) with the holdings of outside directors on the boards
of companies with the best ratings (indicating reasonably paid execu-
tives). This comparison was an attempt to test the hypothesis that
outside directors on the boards of companies that pay their executives
in a "reasoned" manner are more likely to have substantial equity
holdings in those companies than outside directors on the boards of
companies with "overpaid" executives. It was then determined how
many companies in the two groups were run by boards in which
outside directors with individual holdings valued in excess of $10,000 148
constituted a majority of the full board and thus theoretically control-
led that institution. This procedure was repeated for holdings valued
in excess of $25,000, $50,000, $100,000, $125,000, $150,000 and
$200,000.
The results, presented in Table I, tend to confirm the initial
hypothesis on the relationship between equity holdings and effective
compensation oversight. The greater the value of outside director
holdings, the more likely it was that the corporation surveyed would
be managed by "reasonably" compensated executives. In the group of
companies with overcompensated executives, as the value of the stock-
holdings of the outside directors increased, the number of companies
with directors holding such equity positions decreased dramatically. At
the $10,000 level, 83.1% of the companies surveyed had outside direc-
tor stockholdings meeting the relevant criteria. At the $50,000 level,
the percentage dropped substantially to 42.2%, and at the $100,000
level, the percentage fell to 18.2%. Finally, in the $200,000 category,
the highest level surveyed, only 6.5% of the companies in the overcom-
pensation grouping had outside director equity holdings at that value
level.
The results for those companies in the "reasonable" compensation
category differed significantly. To be sure, there was, as the dollar
criteria grew, a decline in the numbers of companies meeting the
standards at each level. The decline, however, was not nearly as steep
or dramatic as in the overcompensation model and bottomed out at a
significantly higher base percentage. At the $10,000 level, 75.3% of the
14" The stock prices used to calculate the dollar value of the outside directors' stockholdings
reflected the dosing market values of the various stocks as of July 9, 1992. WALL Sr. J., July 9,
1992, at. C3-5.
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companies surveyed had outside director stockholdings meeting the
relevant criteria. At the $50,000 level, the percentage dropped to
48.1%, and at the $100,000 level, the percentage stood at 32.1%.
Finally, in the $200,000 category, 18.5% of the companies in the "rea-
sonable" compensation grouping had outside director equity holdings
at that value level.
While at the lower levels of stockholdings, $10,000-$50,000, the
results in both groups were rather similar, it was when the base hold-
ings reached the $100,000 level that the two groups diverged sig-
nificantly and the effect of equity ownership on compensation patterns
appeared to have the greatest impact. At the $100,000 level, only 18.2%
of the companies in the overcompensation grouping met the equity-
holding criteria; at $150,000, only 11.7%, and at $200,000, just 6.5%.
This differed significantly from those companies in the "reasonable"
compensation grouping where, at the $100,000 level, 32.1% met the
criteria, at the $150,000, 23.5%, and at the $200,000 level, 18.5%. As
the stockholding levels grew, the spread between the two groups in-
creased significantly. At the $100,000 level, 'there were almost twice as
many companies with "reasoned" compensation schemes than those
overcompensating their executives. And at the highest level, the spread
between the two grew to almost three times in number.
What, then, do these numbers demonstrate and how do they
relate to an equity-based solution to the overcompensation problem?
The results of this survey suggest that at lower levels of outside director
equity ownership—that is, less than $50,000—the impact of equity
ownership on director behavior seems inconsequential. But as the
value of director holdings increases, the two groups experience sub-
stantial divergence in result. Substantially fewer of the corporations
that are overpaying their executives, at least by the standards of the
Business Week study, are run by boards numerically dominated by
outside directors with substantial equity holdings in those businesses—
that is, greater than $100,000 per director. Many more of the compa-
nies that are reasonably compensating their directors have boards
numerically controlled by outside directors with large stockholding
positions. At the $200,000 level, there are almost three times as many
companies that "reasonably" compensate their executives as those in
the overcompensation category. Although this is obviously not a survey
of great scientific precision, it does suggest that there may be some
connection between heightened equity-ownership and more effective
compensation oversight. The more substantial the holdings become,
the greater the appearance of a link between stock ownership and the
kind of effective monitoring that leads to reasoned compensation. This
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fact gives support to the theory that the creation of substantial equity
positions in the outside directors may lead to more effective compen-
sation oversight.
Missing, of course, from an interpretation of the results of the
study, is any indication of the effect of a five-year board term on
director behavior. None of the 158 companies surveyed had such a
term structure. What does appear from the results, however, is an
indication of the positive impact not simply of stock ownership, but of
substantial stock ownership. The key to more effective compensation
monitoring, then, is to create in each outside director a substantial
equity position in the business itself. The payment of director fees in
stock, in combination with five-year terms of office, will create such
holdings. As noted earlier, 149 implementation of this plan will result in
outside director stakes in the larger corporations of at least $175,000,
or even higher, which, as indicated in the survey, is well above the level
at which positive benefit appears to begin.
The empirical evidence yielded by this study, does suggest that in
the realm of executive compensation, companies with boards com-
posed of outside directors with significant shareholdings, are less sus-
ceptible to the charge of executive overcompensation than those com-
panies that do not. Fewer of those companies that are believed to
overcompensate their executives, have outside directors with sig-
nificant holdings in the business than those enterprises with levels of
executive pay that are viewed as proportionate to services delivered.
An alignment of the directors' interests with those of the shareholders,
rather than with management, through the development of large
shareholding positions resulting in more effective oversight, would
explain this phenomenon. Thus, an equity-based approach to the
compensation controversy seems potentially helpful and warranted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Executive overcompensation is a serious problem that weakens the
corporate enterprise and undermines public confidence in the man-
agement of our largest institutions. It is primarily the result of ineffec-
tive monitoring and bargaining on the part of corporate boards of
directors. Unlike a number of governance issues, it is not susceptible
to effective solution through the normal operation of market forces.
Overcompensation is not merely a problem in and of itself. Rather, it
is symptomatic of a more serious problem within the corporation—that
144 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
996	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:937
of a management unresponsive to shareholder welfare because it is
unchecked by appropriate monitoring and oversight by an active and
involved board. Such self-interested management, motivated primarily
by personal gain, may create the kind of ineffective corporate enter-
prise that will result both in diminished shareholder profit and less-
ened overall societal wealth. Eventually, when corporate productivity
declines sufficiently to provoke a market-based response to the situ-
ation—the wholesale replacement of management—the problem of
overcompensation will be remedied. But by the time this occurs, the
damage to the enterprise that ineffective management brings will al-
ready have taken place and, in the highly competitive world market,
may prove fatal to the enterprise. Thus, in practice, a market-based
solution may come along too late to save the enterprise, and is an
ineffective remedy to the problem.
This destructive result need not occur. The key is to prevent the
problem from ever developing, not to "solve" it once it has manifested
itself and lessened shareholder value. A number of solutions to execu-
tive overcompensation have been proffered including heightened dis-
closure, tax-based remedies, judicial involvement, institutional share-
holder activism, and strengthened board compensation committees.
Several of these approaches attempt to eliminate the problem without
attacking the root causes, thus creating the potential for its eventual
reemergence. All, unfortunately, will ultimately prove ineffective, and
some even potentially harmful to corporate well-being.
The most effective solution lies in stimulating effective board
oversight. We must reinvigorate the board from within; each director
must function as his or her own motivational force. The only real
long-term solution to the compensation controversy is to create effec-
tive management monitoring based on board self-motivation. Such
internal motivation will result from substantial equity-ownership on the
part of the outside directors. To create the sizeable shareholdings that
may achieve such positive monitoring, directors should be paid their
annual fee in company stock. To ensure that the holdings grow large
enough to induce the desired behavior, this equity-compensation pro-
posal must be combined with a quinquennial term of office for each
board member. Director stock ownership may not prove the compre-
hensive cure to the overcompensation problem, but the costs of this
approach are minimal and it is a good beginning. This proposal may
well result in more reasoned executive compensation schemes, more
effective board oversight, and, most importantly, a healthier, more
competitive corporation.
